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The Uneasy Case Against the Uniform Commercial
Code
Robert K Rasmussen*
The last decade has not been kind to the Uniform Commercial
Code ("U.C.C."). Prior to the last ten years, the U.C.C. was long
regarded as one of the more, if not the most, successful projects in
American lawmaking. Its self-stated goal of uniformity was achieved
to a remarkable extent. All American jurisdictions, including
Louisiana, have adopted the U.C.C.' Only acts of Congress could
challenge the U.C.C. when it came to ensuring that the same legal
rules would be found in every state. While there was a smattering of
other uniform laws that had achieved widespread adoption, the areas
of law covered by these statutes do not approach the depth and scope
of the areas covered by the U.C.C. When it came to uniformity in an
important area of state law, the U.C.C. had no serious contenders.
The U.C.C.'s success was more than simply achieving harmony
among the various states. The substance of the U.C.C. was, by and
large, considered a success as well. Perhaps the two most widely
used portions of the Code in the life of a commercial lawyer, and a
law student, are Article 2 and Article 9. Both were held in high
esteem by the practicing bar and the professoriate. Article 2 was seen
as the crowning achievement of perhaps the greatest legal academic
of the 20th Century, Karl Llewellyn.2 Its focus on commercial
Copyright 2002, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW.
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Vanderbilt
Law School. I would to thank Ted Janger, Avery Katz, all of the participants at theLSU Hawkland Conference in general and Alan Schwartz in particular for helpful
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1. Information on the states' adoption of the various sections of the UniformCommercial Code can be found on the website of the National Conference ofCommissioners on Uniform State Law available at http://www.nccusl.org. Editor'sNote: Louisiana has not adopted the uniform version of U.C.C. Article 2 in whole,but has revised the Louisiana Civil Code law of Sales to parallel U.C.C. Article 2.See James W. Bowers, Incomplete Law, 62 La. L. Rev. 1229, 1231 n.12 and n.13(2002).
2. There is, not surprisingly, a large literature on Llewellyn, includingWilliam Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement (1973) [hereinafter
"Twinning"]; Douglas G. Baird, Llewellyn's Heirs, 62 La. L. Rev. 1287 (2002);
Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability, and Discretionary
Acceleration: Of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68Tex. L. Rev. 169 (1989); Alan Schwartz, Karl Llewellyn and the Origins of
Contract Theory, in The Jurisprudential Foundations ofCorporate and Commercial
Law 12 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2002); Robert E. Scott, The Rise and
Fall ofArticle 2, 62 La. L. Rev. 1009 (2002) [hereinafter "Scott, Rise and Fall"];
Zipporah B. Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant
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reasonableness was viewed as a triumph of realism over formalism.
Law adapted to business practice, rather than forcing businessmen to
structure their transactions to adhere to the doctrinal niceties of times
past.
Article 9 was viewed as an even more remarkable achievement.
Article 2 had been built on its predecessor, the Uniform Sales Act.
It was a successful offspring of a good, if somewhat worn, project.'
Article 9, in contrast, had no such lineage. The drafters of Article 9
succeeded in melding together a welter of various state laws into a
single, comprehensive statute governing the transfer of security
interests in personal property.' With Article 9, the drafters succeeded
in creating a law of general scope that was uniformly adopted. Few
federal laws and virtiially no state laws rivaled the U.C.C. in terms of
its craftsmanship.
Other areas of the U.C.C. were held in similar high regard. In
particular, Article 5 on letters of credit operated smoothly, as did
Article 7 on warehouse receipts. Moreover, the U.C.C. process
repeatedly demonstrated its flexibility, both by periodic updates of
the extant articles and by the addition of new ones. After a six year
gestation period, Article 2A was added in 1987 to handle issues
relating to leases. Article 4A on wire fund transfers was added to the
U.C.C. stable in 1989. Article 9 had been revised in 1972, and
Articles 3 and 4 had been updated in 1990. The Permanent Editorial
Board stood ready to provide guidance in between these major
events. The U.C.C. was thus not only a remarkable achievement
when first composed, but it also managed to keep pace with the
times.
The success of the U.C.C., both in terms of its substance and its
widespread adoption, was routinely attributed to its genesis. This
was no partisan legislation written to secure immediate gain. Nor
was it a hasty, ill thought-out response to a single problem. Rather,
Rules, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 465 (1987). On how time has lessened Llewellyn's
influence on current law, see Gregory E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn 's Fading Imprint
on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 71 U. Colo. L. Rev. 541
(2000).
3. For example, see Homer Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 U. Ill. L. Forum 321, 330-32.
4. This is not to imply that Article 2 was simply a carrying forward of the
Sales Act. Indeed, the principal drafter of the Sales Act, Samuel Williston, attacked
Article 2 for not hewing to the Sales Act closely enough. See Samuel Williston,
The Law ofSales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 561
(1950). Rather, the point is simply that the drafters of Article 2 had the Sales Act
as a point of departure.
5. See 1 Grant Gilmore Security Interests in Personal Property (1965); Edward
L. Rubin, Efficiency, Equity and the Proposed Revisions ofArticles 3 and 4, 42 Ala.
L. Rev. 551, 557 (1991) [hereinafter "Rubin"].
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the U.C.C. was the long, careful, systematic work of some of the
country's leading scholars and attorneys.6 It was drafted under the
auspices of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and the American Law Institute. Moreover, these groups
kept a watchful eye on their handiwork to ensure that it remained
current. In short, the U.C.C. was often seen as the exemplar of what
could be done when experts were allowed to till the field.
To be sure, one could always pick nits. Section 2-207 on the
battle of the forms was always good for a few laughs.7 Article 3
recalled a somewhat mythical past in which negotiable instruments
traversed the country as couriers without luggage.8 The process by
which Article 4 was drafted, notorious in commercial law circles for
the high-handed lobbing by the American Bankers Association, was
likened to "appointing a committee of dogs to draw up a protective
ordinance for cats."' Article 4 has always been viewed as the price
that had to be paid to ensure that the banking lobby would not derail
the entire U.C.C. project. But these complaints were merely a side
show. Indeed, what made them noteworthy was that they stood out
from the rest of the project. The U.C.C. as a whole was universally
seen as a praiseworthy achievement. In law school classrooms across
the country, the U.C.C. was the gold standard. It was the exemplar
of what a law should be. It may not have been perfect, but it was the
best that we had.
What a difference a decade makes. The U.C.C. now finds itself
under attack on various fronts. The few isolated snipings of the past
became full broadside attacks. Some academics have gone so far as
to argue that Article 2 and Article 9, the pillars of the U.C.C., should
both be simply tossed away. Article 2 has been said to be inferior to
6. On the genesis of the U.C.C., see Twining, supra note 2, chp. 11; Allen R.
Kamp, Uptown Act: A History ofthe Uniform Commercial Code: 1940-49,51 SMU
L. Rev. 275 (1998); Allen R. Kamp, Downtown Code: A History of the Uniform
Commercial Code 1949-1954, 49 Buff. L. Rev. 359 (2001).
7. For a summary of the current literature of U.C.C. § 2-207 (2000), see
Daniel Keating, Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action, 98 Mich. L. Rev.
2678, 2679-87 (2000); see also, James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform
Commercial Code 6 (4th ed. 1995) ("[T]he section is like an amphibious tank that
was originally designed to fight in the swamps, but was sent to fight in the desert."
Id.).
8. See Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13
Creighton L. Rev. 441 (1979).
9. See letter from Grant Gilmore to Donald J. Raspon (Oct. 8, 1980) quoted
in Donald J. Rapson, Review of the Law of Modern Payment Systems and Notes, 41
Bus. Law. 675, 677 (1986) (book review); see also Frederick K. Beutel, The
Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code Should Not Be Adopted, 61 Yale L.J. 334,
362-63 (1952) (arguing that Article 4 was drafted by banks and represented "a
deliberate sell-out." Id. at 362.).
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both common law made by judges"° and to private law crafted by
trade organizations. " The basic complaint is that Article 2's focus on
commercial reasonableness and trade usage asks more than the
litigation process can deliver. Judges and lay jurors operating within
the confines of the adversarial system cannot be expected to master
industry practices. Even if they could, there is no guarantee that the
parties would, before the fact, want to be legally committed to
following those practices. Contracting parties may well have a norm
of live-and-let-live when things are going well while at the same time
expecting to be able to insist on rigid adherence to the terms of the
contract if a dispute goes to litigation. Moreover, the vague standards
of Article 2 leave so much room for differing judicial interpretations
that Article 2 fails to provide similar results across jurisdictions. In
light of these concerns over whether Article 2 is in fact normatively
desirable, even if one wanted to keep Article 2 around, parties should
be allowed to contract out of its coverage quickly and easily.
2
The debates over Article 9 have been extensive and wide ranging.
As an initial matter, many questioned whether secured creditor
promoted economic efficiency at all. 3 Still others asserted that
Article 9 encouraged inefficient investment because it allowed the
debtor and the secured creditor to externalize costs onto nonadjusting
10. See Robert E. Scott, The Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law, in The
Jurisprudential Foundations of Corporate and Commercial Law 147 (Jody S. Kraus
& Steven D. Walt eds., 2000) [hereinafter "Scott, Uniformity Norm"]; Scott, Rise
and Fall, supra note 2, at 1017.
11. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the
Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765 (1995); Lisa
Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Value Creation
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724 (2001); Lisa
Bernstein, Formalism in Commercial Law: The Questionable Empirical Basis of
Article 2's Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 710
(1999).
12. As an example of the ease of contracting out of the U.C.C., the current
version of Article 5 allows parties to contract for the rules set forth in the Uniform
Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits by a simple statement to that effect.
See U.C.C. § 5-116(c) (2000).
13. The literature here is extensive. For early work on why secured credit
poses an efficiency problem, see Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman,
Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 Yale L.J. 1143, 1147-61
(1979); Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate
Settings, 92 Yale L.J. 49 (1982); Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy
Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1981); F.H. Buckley,
The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 Va. L. Rev. 1393 (1986). Rather than
extending this citation string for pages, I simply refer the curious to two excellent
symposiums on the topic of secured credit, one in the Virginia Law Review, see 80
Va. L. Rev. No. 8 (1994), and the other in Cornell Law Review, see 82 Cornell L.
Rev. 1279-1576 (1997) [hereinafter "Cornell Symposium"].
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unsecured creditors. 4 We still lack an academic consensus on the
appropriate scope of secured credit. There is widespread agreement
that we lack sufficient data to resolve many of the key questions.
In a somewhat different vein, Alan Schwartz argued that even if
contractual priority produces a net benefit for society, this benefit
could be generated without the current Article 9. Article 9 sets forth
a system by which a debtor can, via contract, grant priority rights in
its various assets to various lenders. Each state is responsible for
maintaining a registry in which each secured creditor can file notice
of its security interest. Even if this institution of secured credit is
efficient, according to Schwartz, it can be generated more easily. A
simple rule of enforcing negative pledge clauses against third parties
would work better.' 5 To be sure, Article 9 may be better than its
predecessors in terms of its ease of use, but it is by no means the best
that can be done.
Perhaps even more dramatic than the questioning of the substance
of the U.C.C. has been the attack on the U.C.C. drafting process
itself. The vision of the drafting process as being conducted by high-
minded experts simply trying to improve the law has been replaced
by a more realistic, less flattering one. The U.C.C. is now viewed as
the output of a private legislature.' Like all legislatures, this
legislature is comprised of individuals who have their own biases and
goals. Moreover, the drafting process is susceptible to interest group
pressures, which rather than producing the best law possible, may
generate a law that serves the need of the interest group. Indeed, this
private legislature is worse in some respects than a public one. In
those cases where competing interest groups exist, the private
legislature lacks the institutional structure to resolve these competing
claims, thus yielding either vague statutory provisions or even
gridlock.
This reconception of the way in which the text of the U.C.C.
comes into being has led to a new, more jaded view of most of the
U.C.C. provisions. Article 9 is now seen as the output of attorneys
14. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the
Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 Yale L.J. 857 (1996) [hereinafter
"Bebchuk & Fried"], and the Cornell Symposium, supra note 13.
15. See Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. Legal Stud. 209
(1989); Alan Schwartz, Priority Contracts and Priority in Bankruptcy, 82 Cornell
L. Rev. 1396 (1997).
16. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private
Legislatures, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 595 (1995) [hereinafter "Schwartz & Scott"]; Larry
E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayshi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws,
25 J. Legal Stud. 131 (1996). See also Nicholas S. Zeppos, Reforming a Private
Legislature: The Maturation of the American Law Institute as a Legislative Body,
23 Law & Soc. Inquiry 657 (1998).
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for lenders who write the rules so as to favor their clients. 7 Banks
and their attorneys likewise dominate the formulation of Articles 3,
4 and 4A; here, they use their influence to ensure that they owe little,
if any, duties to their customers.' By and large, most rights that a
customer has against its bank come from her contract with the bank
and not from Articles 3 and 4. 9 Article 2 is the inconclusive struggle
between business interests and consumer interests.2 ° The academics
who often carry a large load in the drafting process are seen as trying
to advance their own agenda. This agenda may include their own
normative vision of the law, the desire for cultivating prestige with
the practicing bar, or even procuring consulting opportunities. Any
overlap between the public interest and the U.C.C. is one of
circumstance, not inevitability.
The U.C.C.'s problems do not exist only in the scholarly milieu.
The revision of the hallowed Article 2 has become something of a
farce. Various drafts have come and gone.2' Reporters resigned in
protest.22 A newspaper ad was purchased in an attempt to influence
the vote of one of the proposed revisions. Attempts to bring other
areas of commerce with Article 2's orbit, most notably information
technology, have failed miserably and visibly. Year after year has
passed, and still the ALI has not submitted a single draft of the
revised Article 2 to the states. Courts have struggled with addressing
the problems of the information age with the tools created decades
ago." What began as an attempt to modernize and broaden the scope
of Article 2 now has the more modest goal of simply cleaning up
17. See Edward J. Jangcr, Predicting When the Uniform Law Process Will Fail:
Article 9, Capture, and the Race to the Bottom, 83 Iowa L. Rev. 569 (1998)
[hereinafter "Janger"]; Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and
the Uniform Law Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78
Minn. L. Rev. 83 (1993); Robert E. Scott, The Politics ofArticle 9, 80 Va. L. Rev.
1783 (1994) [hereinafter "Scott, Politics"].
18. See Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a Lobbyist:
Some Notes on the Process of Revising Articles 3 and 4, 26 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 743
(1993); Rubin, supra note 5.
19. To be sure, Article 4 grants a customer the right to stop payment on a
check. See U.C.C. § 4-403 (2000). Technological developments that have sped up
the check collection process have eroded much of the value of this right. See
Ronald Mann, Information Technology and Non-Legal Sanctions in Financing
Transactions, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1627 (2001).
20. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 16; Scott, Politics. supra note 17; Scott,
Rise and Fall, supra note 2.
21. For a summary of the process up to 2001, see Richard E. Speidel, Revising
U.C.C. Article 2: A View from the Trenches, 52 Hastings L.J. 607 (2001)
[hereinafter "Speidel"].
22. Seeid. at611.
23. One prominent example is the treatment of shrinkwrap and click through
license agreements, see Pro CD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
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some of the language. Indeed, the current effort has been
downgraded from a full-scale revision of Article 2 to isolated
amendments of the existing statute. Even this modest goal is not
assured of success. Not much to show for over a decade's worth of
work.
While the Article 2 revision process was suffering through this
imbroglio, Article 9's most recent facelift had problems of its own.
Whereas the Article 2 process resembles full-scale war, the Article
9 process looks more like the circling of the wagons. As noted
above, serious questions have been raised about the vigor with which
secured credit should be respected. The closest thing to an academic
consensus that we have on the issue is that the current system slights
the interests of tort victims." Law and economics scholars have
pointed out that this system creates an incentive for firms to take
excessive risk. Firms enjoy limited liability, but participate fully in
the gains from any investment. In deciding whether or not to
undertake an investment, the firm thus does not expect to bear the full
cost of failure. In particular, to the extent that a project causes
injuries and the firm lacks sufficient assets to compensate the victims,
the victims will suffer the loss. In a similar vein, some scholars drew
on philosophy to question why it is appropriate to compensate
voluntary creditors of a firm before compensating involuntary
creditors. Voluntary creditors pick whom to deal with and on what
terms; tort victims do not. Despite this agreement and repeated
attempts to raise the issue in the drafting process, it appears that the
Article 9 drafting process did not consider the issue seriously." The
drafting committee, stocked with representatives of secured lenders,
simply was not interested. For academics attempting to analogize the
U.C.C. rough-and-tumble drafting process to the ordinary legislative
process, these events could not have been more timely. The U.C.C.
has unquestionably lost some of its luster.
The U.C.C. may not be what it was once held out to be.
Conceding that, however, does not warrant jettisoning the process.
The U.C.C., after all, began as an attempt to create a better law than
what existed at the time.26 It may in fact be far inferior to its
academic competitors. Academics writing scholarship enjoy a
number of comparative advantages over actual drafters of legislation.
First, they rarely engage in the process of composing actual
24. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the
Priority ofSecured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics,
82 Cornell L. Rev. 1279, 1296-98 (1997), and the sources cited therein.
25. See Janger, supra note 17, at. 611-12; William J. Woodward, Jr., The
Realist and Secured Credit: Grant Gilmore, Common-Law Courts, and the Article
9 Reform Process, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 1511, 1511-12 (1997).
26. On the aims and methods of Llewellyn, see Baird, supra note 2.
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legislation; rather, they simply set out the broad parameters that
would be followed in a perfect world. Thus, they don't have to sweat
the details and come to grips with areas where their theory may be
difficult or impossible to implement in practice. Second, each author
must convince no one but himself. Compromise is not the nature of
the academic enterprise.
However, the U.C.C. competes not against academic visions of
optimal regulation but against products of other flawed institutional
processes. Bringing interest group analysis to the private legislature
has not removed interest groups from public legislatures. With our
new understanding of the drafting process of the U.C.C., the question
becomes one of comparative political economy-which of the many
imperfect institutions should have the primary authority for crafting
commercial law.27 Here, the U.C.C. does have advantages over
public legislatures that have been under appreciated in the recent
debate. Primarily, the structure of the U.C.C. drafting and revision
process suggests that it will produce a more technically competent set
of laws than would a public legislature. Much legislation produced
by public legislatures is a slapdash affair.28 On average, it is going
to have more gaps and internal inconsistencies than legislation
produced via the U.C.C. process. In addition, the U.C.C. may reduce
rent extraction by public legislatures. The need to adhere to the
U.C.C. constrains the ability of legislators to offer favors to interest
groups. Finally, even in areas where interest group dynamics suggest
that there will be predictable flaws in the rules generated by the
U.C.C. drafting process, the current situation which allows selective
intervention by the federal government may be preferable to one that
lodged initial lawmaking responsibility either in the state legislatures
or the federal government.29 For at least some areas covered by the
U.C.C., the current flawed process may be the best that we can hope
for.
Part I reviews the history and scope of the U.C.C. Part II then
engages in a comparative institutional analysis. Part II first reviews
the now-standard critiques of the U.C.C. drafting process. It then
compares the shortcomings of this process to the shortcomings
inherent in all possible alternatives-federal law, either in the form
of legislation passed by Congress or regulations promulgated by an
administrative agency; state law absent input from a coordinating
27. On the need for comparative institutional analysis, see Janger, supra note
17, at 626; Pachtel, supra note 17, at 136.
28. See Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative
Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 575, 590-93 (2002).
29. Cf Janger, supra note 17, at 628-31 (suggesting that the U.C.C. process
continues in some areas, but "abstains" from action in others so that the federal
government would set the rules in those areas).
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body; and the common law. This Part also articulates the hidden
benefits of the U.C.C. process. While the U.C.C. process should not
be given unfettered dominion of all that it currently covers, a system
for producing commercial law that includes the extant U.C.C. process
is decidedly better than one that does not.
I. THE CURRENT SCOPE OF THE U.C.C.
The Uniform Commercial Code strikes many a law student as
something of a dog's breakfast. This description does not stem from
a failure to achieve its self-stated goal of uniformity. The U.C.C. no
doubt achieved uniformity in the areas that it covers. All American
jurisdictions have enacted the U.C.C., usually without any significant
local variations.30 The most recent example of the hold that the
U.C.C. has achieved over the areas that it covers was the speed by
which the new version of Article 9 was passed.3 Revised Article 9
received approval from the American Law Institute ("ALl") in May
1998 and from the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") in July 1998.32 The revision had
a proposed effective date of July 1, 2001. All states and the District
of Columbia have enacted the new Article 9. The only difference
among the states was that four of them inserted effective dates that
were a few months later than the one proposed by the drafters. This
success stands in marked contrast to most of the proposed model laws
promulgated by NCCUSL. NCCUSL has proposed over a hundred
uniform laws. None of them can rival the U.C.C. for both its
uniformity and the scope of the areas covered.3
The U.C.C., however, falls short of its lofty goals in its scope.
The phrase "Commercial Code" implies a set of laws covering all of
commercial practice. It evokes an image of being comprehensive.34
Prior to the U.C.C., there were various uniform laws-the Sales Act,
the Negotiable Instruments Law, the Uniform Warehouse Receipts
Act, the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, the Uniform Bills of Lading
Act, the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, and the Uniform Trust
Receipts Act-but there was no "Code." The U.C.C. was a conscious
30. As Bob Scott has pointed out, however, in Article 2 the veneer of
uniformity comes at the cost of vague standards that will lead to non-uniform
results as court apply these standards in practice. See Scott, Uniformity Norm,
supra note 10.
31. On the reasons for the speed of this adoption, see discussion below.
32. For a description of the respective roles of the ALI and NCCUSL in
drafting changes to the U.C.C., see Schwartz & Scott, supra note 16.
33. If you doubt this statement, just visit the NCCUSL website, supra note 1.
34. On the implications of the word "Code," see William D. Hawland, Uniform
Commercial "Code" Methodology, 1962 U. Ill. L. Forum 291.
2002] 1105
6LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
attempt to systemize the area of commercial law.35 Yet, if one looks
at the general area of commercial law, there are surprises both in
what the U.C.C. does not cover and what it does. Article 2, the first
substantive article of the U.C.C., addresses perhaps the most
ubiquitous of areas of commercial practice, contracts. Almost all
commercial transactions involve voluntary exchanges. Yet Article
2's reach is limited. It only applies to the sale of goods. This leaves
contracts for the sale of real estate and for personal services to the
common law for their regulation. The recent attempt to expand
Article 2 to expressly address many issues arising from information
technology has failed.36
A somewhat related area of contract practice that is now outside
the ambit of Article 2 is the validity of contracts formed over the
internet. While one can make a respectable argument that electronic
contracts satisfy Article 2's statute of frauds provision, significant
pressure from those who sell goods over the internet spurred action
to ensure this result. NCCUSL weighed in first with a non-U.C.C.
uniform law, the Uniform Transactions Act. Congress then
guaranteed uniform enforceability of electronic contracts by passing
the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act,
which removes this area from state law regulation.37
Article 2 thus seems destined to be limited to the sale of goods.
However, a normative justification for handling these contracts by a
uniform statute and other contracts by an amalgam of common law
and nonuniform state law is lacking. No one has put forward a case
as to why sales of goods contracts need a body of law that is distinct
from the body of law that governs land or services contracts. Nor has
there been any argument pressed as to why there is a need for
uniformity in the goods context that does not exist in other areas.
Article 9 likewise touches upon an important commercial
practice, but like Article 2, only covers a subset of transactions that
serve the same general purpose. Article 9 regulates the granting of
security interests. Security interests, like contracts, are part of the
staple of commercial lawyers. Many firms that borrow money give
collateral to at least some of their lenders. Article 9, however, does
35. See id.
36. Information goods were originally going to be brought into the Article 2
fold with the "hub and spoke" concept. When this failed, these transactions were
going to be handled by a separate article, Article 2B. Unable to reach agreement
on Article 2B, those in charge of the U.C.C. have abandoned the attempt. Such
transactions are now covered by a non-U.C.C. project, the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act ("UCITA"). See Speidel, supra note 21, at 612-14.
37. For a discussion of congressional involvement in this area, see Suzanna
Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: Congress and the Common Law in Cyberspace, 55
Vand. L. Rev. 309 (2002).
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not apply to all pledges of collateral. Notably missing from Article
9 are security interests in land, which are governed by state law, and
in patents and copyrights, which are governed by federal law. This
lack of completeness ensures that Article 9 will not cover a bulk of
financing transactions. Real estate transactions, at least in terms of
dollar amounts, currently dominate asset-based finance, and the
importance of intellectual property rights as collateral is increasing.
While Articles 2 and 9 are the most notable of the U.C.C.
provisions, other parts of the U.C.C. suffer from limitations
as well. Article 8 has a somewhat different limitation than
does Articles 2 and 9. It covers all securities, and securities
no doubt are an important aspect of commercial practice.
However, the U.C.C. fails to cover many of the important
questions surrounding securities. Article 8 sets forth
provisions detailing how the ownership interest of securities
is assigned, which includes how one can pledge securities as
collateral. Yet much of the action in securities law concerns
the actions that a firm and its managers can take in
connection with the issuance and purchase of securities.
Here, both federal and state law impose important
requirements, but they are not found in the U.C.C.
Additionally, there are areas of commercial practice that are
entirely untouched by the Commercial Code. Most businesses have
insurance to cover many of the risks that they face. Indeed, in
contracts for various services, it is often an important issue as to
which party is required to procure insurance. There is also the
insurance agreement itself, which at bottom is a species of contract.
Yet nothing in the U.C.C. purports to establish legal rules regardinginsurance."'
Bankruptcy law also is generally considered part of commercial
practice, but it cannot be found in the U.C.C." To be sure, any
bankruptcy case will likely involve U.C.C. issues. Contracts for
goods may create either claims or assets for the debtor, and lenders
with personal property as collateral need perfected security interests
as required by Article 9 if they want a secured claim. However, the
38. The closest one gets in U.C.C.§ 2-320 (2000), which states that the term
"C.I.F." means that the price includes the cost of insurance and freight.
39. Of course, bankruptcy law can equally be viewed as part of general
corporate law. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler, A Theory of Corporate Insolvency, 72
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 343 (1997); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End
of Bankruptcy, 55 Stan. L. Rev. _ (publication forthcoming 2002); Robert K.
Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 Tex.
L. Rev. 51 (1992); David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law
and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 471 (1994).
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substance of bankruptcy law is in the Baikruptcy Code, not the
Uniform Commercial Code.
So much for the puzzling exclusions. On the other hand, the
U.C.C. contains provisions that cover areas that seem to be of little
relevance today. The heart of Article 3 as originally drafted-the
holder in due course doctrine-is mostly of historical interest. 0 It has
been decades since the economy hinged on ensuring the easy flow of
negotiable instruments. Article 6 on bulk sales is quickly flickering out
of existence.4' Article 7 on warehouse receipts seems to be doing just
fine, though warehouse receipts do not strike one as a growing aspect
of commercial practice.
Other parts of the U.C.C. retain vitality, but only because they
mimic other laws. Much of Article 4 ostensibly sets out the rules for
the check collection process. Federal law, in the form of Regulation
CC, has taken over that task.42 Article 5 retains its influence because
the drafters of the recent amendments to that provision decided to
resolve all conflicts between the original Article 5 and its
competitor-the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary
Credits, promulgated by the International Chamber of Commerce-in
favor of the competitor.43
To be sure, in addition to various revisions of extant articles, there
have been two notable attempts to keep the U.C.C. current in the half
century since its conception. In the early 1980s, Article 2A was added.
Article 2A covers leases; like the rest of the U.C.C., it only extends to
personal property. Article 4A, added in 1989, covers wire fund
transfers. The Federal Reserve Board has adopted Article 4A as the
provision that regulates all wire fund transfers over its system.
In short, if a commercial lawyer were to draft a list of topics that
should be covered in a uniform commercial code, that list may bear
some similarity to our current U.C.C., but the overlap would by no
means be perfect. The U.C.C. does. contain some staples of
commercial law, but parts of the U.C.C. are never touched by a
practicing lawyer. Moreover, such a lawyer often has to turn to other
sources to resolve important issues of commercial law.
The import of the hodgepodge nature of the U.C.C., from
anything other than an aesthetic point of view, is not readily apparent.
40. See Gilmore, supra note 8; Ronald Mann, Negotiability in Payment and
Credit Systems, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 951 (1997).
41. NCCUSL and the ALI have recommended that Article 6 be repealed. See
Official Text of U.C.C. § 6, Alternative A.
42. Article 4 is currently being redrafted, and part of the goal had to been to
ensure that Article 4 was congruent with Regulation CC. This part of the revision
effort has been abandoned.
43. See Ronald J. Mann, Payment Systems and Other Financial Transactions
216 (Aspen 1999).
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Indeed, one can discount the lack of comprehensive scope of the
U.C.C. It might matter to the drafters of the U.C.C. how
comprehensive their product is-we all like to see our work as
important-but it may matter little to the practicing lawyer. All of the
areas that are not covered by the U.C.C. are covered by some other
law. It is not as if there is no law for contracts for services or pledges
of real estate. Why should we care whether the law of sales can be
found in the U.C.C. and the law of contracts for services in the
common law? Does it really matter whether the bankruptcy attorney
picks up a volume labeled "The Bankruptcy Code" rather than
"Article 10 of the U.C.C."? To be sure, one has to worry about
consistency between Article 9 and the Bankruptcy Code, but such
consistency' would be an issue even if both were enacted by the same
sovereign. 4 So what if Article 3 insists on carrying forward the
tradition of the holder in due course? The FTC has tamed the more
pernicious uses of the doctrine,45 so we are left with provisions that
may do little, if any, harm.
Put another way, what matters to practicing lawyers and
academics is the substance of the law. Neither uniformity-which
the U.C.C. has-nor comprehensiveness-which it does not-are
ultimate goals. A uniform, comprehensive commercial code filled
with cumbersome, inefficient and vague rules has little to commend
it. What counts is the content of the law, not its cover.
What the tattered coverage of the U.C.C. does suggest, however,
is that perhaps we do not need the current uniform law process at all.
If some areas of the law can be handled on a state-by-state basis and
other areas by federal legislation, one cannot posit a priori that
commerce would grind to a halt were the ALI and NCCUSL to exit
the field. To be sure, one also cannot assume that public lawmaking
institutions would necessarily perform better than the private ones.
The next part of this essay first explores how we have reached the
patchwork system that we have. It then explores what advantages the
uniform law process may have over its competitors.
44. There have been repeated attempts to ensure consistency between Article
9 and the Bankruptcy Code. For example, as part of the reform process that led to
the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, the National Bankruptcy Conference established a
committee on the coordination ofthe Bankruptcy Act and the Uniform Commercial
Code. Grant Gilmore was the committee's chair. See Steven L. Harris, A Reply to
Theodore Eisenberg's Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 327, 331-
34 (1982). See also Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Revised Article
9 and the Bankruptcy Code: Policy and Impact, 9 Amer. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 85(200 1) (reporters for the revised Article 9 arguing that the new Article 9 comports
with bankruptcy policy).
45. See 16 C.F.R.§ 433.2(a) (2001).
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II. COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY
Commercial law emanates from a variety of institutions. Courts,
state legislatures acting on their own, state legislatures coordinating
through the uniform law process, and Congress each have primary
responsibility for different facets of commercial law. Moreover,
there is a hierarchy in this process. These institutions are not coequal
decision-makers. State legislative action can trump judicial
decisions, and Congressional action beats both. Action by an
institution higher up on the food chain precludes consideration by all
institutions below it. This division of various institutions raises two
distinct questions. The first question is what explains this patchwork
system. Given the curious omissions and inclusions of the U.C.C.,
one needs a story as to how they developed. The second question is
a normative one. Given that there are a number of institutions from
which to pick, which institution does, on average, a better job?
A. How Did We Get Here?
The history of the drafting of the U.C.C. is a familiar one. Prior
to the U.C.C. project, NCCUSL proposed a number of model laws on
a variety of subjects, with mixed success.46 NCCUSL has its most
consistent success in the area of commercial law. It proposed
numerous commercial acts, which had been adopted with varying
degrees of uniformity. The oldest of these laws was the Negotiable
Instruments Law, which was drafted in secret. Indeed, Dean Ames
at Harvard, the foremost authority on negotiable instruments at the
time, did not learn of the law until it was enacted in a number of
states.47 NCCUSL also promulgated the Uniform Sales Act, which
was drafted by Samuel Williston, the Uniform Warehouse Receipts
Act, the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, Uniform Bills of Lading Act,
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, and the Uniform Trust Receipts
Act. Three of these acts-the ones covering negotiable instruments,
warehouse receipts and stock transfers-were enacted in every state.
This actually overstates the degree of uniformity a bit, in that
NCCUSL proposed amendments to the warehouse receipts act in
1922, and only 16 states adopted these amendments. The next most
adopted provision, the sales act, was adopted in 34 of the then 48
states.48
46. See James J. White, Ex Proprio Vigore, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 2096, 2106-28
(1991) (describing efforts to draft and enact a uniform divorce law).
47. See Gilmore, supra note 8, at 457.
48. See Twining, supra note 2, at 273.
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In the late 1930s, there was a push for a federal sales act.49 This
act, however, would not have achieved uniformity across the country.
The proposed legislation did not cover intrastate sales of goods, and
differed from the Uniform Sales Act. Indeed, the primaryjustification for the Act was to ensure that there was a single set of
rules that foreign courts could look to when litigating disputes that
implicated American law.5" A second justification was that the
current differences in the laws of the various states created difficult
conflicts of laws problems that would be avoided by the adoption of
a federal act that applied to all interstate shipment of goods.' At this
point, William Schnader, the President of NCCUSL and Karl
Llewellyn embarked on the project of creating a uniform commercial
code.
They decided to craft a uniform commercial code built on the
existing foundation of uniform laws. No effort was made to expand
the reach of the extant proposed laws. From its earliest conception,
Llewellyn viewed the scope of the code as covering "the movement
of goods, the payment thereof, and the financing thereof."52
Llewellyn ruled out the regulation of businesses generally on the
grounds that "[w]e have too little experience with their regulation,
and there is too much flux in regard to them." 3 The drafters thus
took the existing uniform laws as the baseline for their subject. They
did not attempt to examine, let alone reinvent, the wheel.54 At this
time, corporate bankruptcy law, which began as common law in
federal court, was the province of the federal government.5 As such,
it was outside of NCCUSL's jurisdiction. Insurance law was never
the subject of any unifying attempt by NCCUSL. Insurance was left
off the table because "local insistence on state control ... [is] too
firmly established to make uniform legislation seem possible. 56
49. See Symposium: The Proposed Federal Sales Act, 26 Va. L. Rev. 537
(1940).
50. See Karl N. Llewellyn, The Needed Federal Sales Act, 26 Va. L. Rev. 558,
558 (1940).
51. Id.at559-60.
52. See Twinning, supra note 2, at 528 (memo from Karl Llewellyn to the
Executive Committee of NCCUSL).
53. Id.
54. See id. ("In essence, then, the Code carries forward and supplements the
fields already occupied by one or another of the widely adopted commercial
statutes.").
55. On the development of bankruptcy law, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Debt's
Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy Law in America, chap. 2 (Princeton Univ.
Press 2001); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Boyd's Legacy and
Blackstone's Ghost, 1999 S.Ct. Rev. 393 (2000).
56. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform Commercial Code, 10
Fla. L. Rev. 367, 378 (1957).
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Similarly, NCCUSL did not attempt to unify real estate law across
the varying states.
Thus, it appears that little thought was given to move the U.C.C.
beyond goods to real estate and services. One can imagine a few
possible reasons for this. Perhaps the most benign reason stems from
the state of economic activity at the time. Manufacturing was the
mainstay of the American economy in the first half of the past
century. Most contracts that involved parties from more than one
state were probably contracts for the sale of goods. Real estate, by
and large, was probably purchased by a local, in-state entity. Service
contracts may have rarely extended across state borders. With this
state of affairs, only the sale of goods implicated the need for a single
set of rules. It was the manufacturers and their distributors that
contended with doctrinal variations across state lines. It was the
buyers and sellers of goods who, absent uniformity, would have to
contend with differing state laws.
To be sure, one could posit other reasons as why some areas of
commercial law never fell within the purview of the uniform law
movement. One reason may be that the local bar may actually
preferred a lack of uniformity when it came to real property.
Property law, like contract law, is basically a feature of state law.
Unlike contract law, however, parties to a transaction involving real
property do not have a choice over which law will apply. A state
where property is located is going to set forth the legal rules
governing that property. This is not so with contracts for goods.
Here, transactions often cross state borders, and lawyers can select
the appropriate law.
In this environment, local lawyers can generate rents by having
the legal rules governing real property vary from those of other
jurisdictions. One way they do this is by increasing the jurisdiction-
specific aspect of the transactions costs that accompany any sale of
property. A party buying land in one state, in addition to having its
regular counsel, will often need to hire a local lawyer to assist with
the transaction. Indeed, the more quirks that exist in a state's law
regarding the transfer of real property, the more a client's regular
counsel will feel compelled to hire local counsel to ensure that the
deal goes through without a hitch. 7 Were property laws uniform
throughout the nation, the less need there may be to consult with
local attorneys. 8 Idiosyncratic state laws, to the extent that a party
57. On the general tendency for transactional attorneys to avoid legal risks, see
Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of
Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 375 (1997).
58. Louisiana is probably the best example of this tendency. Few would
attempt to purchase land in Louisiana without the aid of a local attorney to navigate
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has to use them, increase the market for those lawyers who know
those laws. To be sure, there is a limit on the extent that a state can
play this game. If transactions become too costly, parties will look
for land elsewhere. Nevertheless, some diversity in local law
probably raises the demand for in-state attorneys.
A lack of uniformity on real estate law may provide a second
advantage to those attorneys within any given state. Variation in
state laws may act as a barrier to entry into local legal markets.
States license attorneys, and most states require attorneys wishing to
practice there to sit for the bar exam. The more peculiar a state's
law, the higher the cost to an attorney wishing to enter the
jurisdiction. The attorney has to learn more law than she otherwise
would and also runs a greater risk of not passing the bar exam. While
these two effects may be minor, at least they suggest reasons as to
why local attorneys may not rush to embrace a proposed uniform law
covering contracts for the sale of land.
The same general line of reasoning can assist in explaining the
persistent separation of systems for recording nonpossessory interests
in land and nonpossessory interests in everything else. To be sure,
recordation systems for land predate the ability to take a
nonpossessory security in goods by a number of years. Yet, there is
little or no movement to create a unified system for recordation of all
security interests. Part of the reason for this lack of interest may be
that local lawyers have little reason to make their real estate system
congruent with those of every other state.
Perhaps the most curious division is that between contracts for the
sales of goods and contracts for the sale of services. At first blush,
one would think that services have more of an affinity to goods than
to real property. In the real property setting, certainty exists as to
which law will apply. The property is physically located in a
particular jurisdiction, and that state will dictate which laws apply.
This is not so in the sale of goods area and the service area. In both
situations, any given transaction can cross state lines, and thus a state
cannot be assured that its laws would govern.
Placing contracts for services with those for real estate may
simply reflect the nature of the economy of the time. In the middle
part of the 20th Century, manufacturing was more important relative
to services than it is today.59 Hence, one would think that sales of
through the Louisiana legal system.
59. As an example of this trend, consider that in 1980, well after Article 2 had
been adopted by every state, there were over almost 22 million employees in
manufacturing, and roughly 29 million in the service industry. See Statistical
Abstract of the United States, table 596, at 384 (2001). Twenty years later, the
number of employees in the manufacturing sector had fallen to 20 million, while
the number of those in the service industry had swelled to more than 49 million. Id.
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goods would be on more people's minds. Also, and perhaps more
importantly, it may be that there was a less perceived need for
uniformity in the service area. A manufacturer selling goods across
the country may encounter the law of all fifty states. The more
divergent laws that a firm has to deal with, the higher its transactions
costs will be. Thus, the manufacturing industry would have reason
to throw its weight behind a uniform sales law.
The same is not true for a provider of services. Services contracts
tend to be more individualized transactions. The same service is not
usually provided to consumers in all fifty states. Also, at least when
the U.C.C. was being conceived, service contracts by and large
tended to be more local in nature than sales of goods contracts.
Goods could come from anyjurisdiction. Most contracts for services,
on the other hand, probably involved a local buyer and a local seller.
The fact that jurisdictions differed in their treatment of such contracts
did not loom as a large problem. There is no readily identifiable
group that would see a significant lowering in its costs of doing
business were service contracts subject to a uniform law. In short,
there simply was no benefit to be achieved through a uniform law
governing either service or real estate contracts.
So much for contracts and security interests. What explains the
confusing state of affairs regarding responsibility for regulating
payment systems? Here, the divide is not between state-by-state
regulation and uniform state regulation. This was the area of
commerce that launched the uniform law movement. Indeed the
drive toward a single set of laws in this area predates the existence of
today's most prominent payment system regulator, the Federal
Reserve Board.6" Rather, the relevant divide is whether uniformity
should be supplied by uniform state regulation or by federal law. As
with the curious division of responsibility for contracts, history is
telling. At the time of the original drafting of the U.C.C., the most
prominent payment mechanisms were checks, notes and letters of
credit. These were historically regulated by uniform state laws,
beginning with the Negotiable Instruments Law in the late 19th
Century. It was thus no surprise that they became part of the uniform
law process.
Modem payment systems, especially on the consumer end, did
not develop until after the U.C.C. process had begun. The universal
credit card did not gain widespread use until the rise of the Bank
America Card in the 1960s.6" Federal legislation followed soon
afterward. The Truth-in-Lending Act, which regulates the
60. The NIL was first enacted in 1897; the federal reserve bank system was
created over a decade later in 1913.
61. Edward L. Cooter & Robert Rubin, The Payment System 712-15 (2d ed.
1994).
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cardholder/card issuer transaction, took effect in 1968. With the
federal government regulating credit cards, it was no surprise that debit
cards were viewed as an appropriate subject of federal regulation as
well. While not as generous to the consumer as the Truth-in-Lending
Act, the Electronic Fund Transfer Act went on the books in 1977.
Thus, these two areas, in which banks by and large provide payment
services to consumers, are the province of federal law.
The same is not true with the other primary payment system that
banks offer to consumers, checks. The legal regulation of checks may
be the most convoluted of all commercial law regulation. Checks are
now governed by an amalgam of state law, federal law and federal
regulation. The legal rights of the various parties to a check were, in
the first instance, governed by the NIL. A check, after all, is nothing
more than a draft drawn on a bank. The banks, however, wanted a set
of rules to govern the check collection process. Eventually, Article 4
was added to the U.C.C. to specially handle checks. 62 Article 4,
however, unlike all other Articles, was not self-contained. Rather, it
supplemented the rules set forth for drafts in Article 3. Thus, as the
U.C.C. was originally drafted, checks were governed by the general
commercial paper provisions of Article 3 and by the check-specific
provisions of Article 4.
The federal government got in on the action in the 1980s.
Consumers long complained that banks were putting inordinately long
holds on deposited checks. Nothing in Article 4 regulated when banks
had to make funds available to their customers. Customers routinely
had to wait more than a week in order to draw funds on deposited
checks. Congress responded to consumer complaints by enacting the
Expedited Funds Availability Act, which established a schedule by• 61
which banks made funds available.
The EFAA was the hook that the Federal Reserve used to take
substantial control over regulation of the check collection process.
The law granted power to the Federal Reserve to ensure that banks
complied with the statutory deadlines for making funds available.
The Federal Reserve has used this power to issue Regulation CC,
which regulates the check collection process, thereby displacing
portions of Article 4. Neither Article 4 nor Article 3, however, are
displaced in their entirety. The recent effort by the ALl to update
Article 4 to make it congruent with Regulation CC has fizzled. As
62. The drafting of Article 4 was the most tumultuous of the Code, including
the sacking of the original reporter for the project. For an in-depth history of this
process, see Kamp, supra note 6, at 448-64.
63. See Edward L. Rubin, Uniformity, Regulation, and the Federalization of
State Law: Some Lessons from the Payment System, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1251, 1257-61
(1989).
64. See Memorandum from Ronald J. Mann & Edwin E. Smith, Apr. 3, 2002,
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any teacher of Payment Systems knows, students are bewildered in
trying to figure out which body of law they should turn to when faced
with a problem involving a check.
To be sure, the remaining provisions of the U.C.C. have their own
history as well. Rather than canvassing them in any detail, it is
sufficient to make two points. The first is that one cannot explain the
extant assignment of lawmaking authority among states, the uniform
law process, and the federal government as the result of a conscious
design to divvy up law making authority according to which
institution is best suited to make the rules governing any particular
area. The second point is that to the extent that commercial law
contains provisions designed to protect the welfare of consumers,
these provisions came from either the federal government or the state
government acting alone. The banning of the holder in due course
doctrine in consumer transactions, the protections for unauthorized
use of credit cards and debit cards, the restrictions on deceptive
advertising, and the availability of funds all came from the federal
government. States often pass legislation designed to safeguard
consumer interests. The drafters of the various provisions of the
U.C.C., however, have not been interested in such measures.65
The extant assignment is thus both path dependent and relatively
inhospitable to consumer lobbying efforts. Saying this, however,
does not necessarily suggest that the U.C.C. should be consigned to
the dustbin. The next part assesses the relative merits of the current
uniform law process on the one hand, and nonuniform state
lawmaking and federal lawmaking on the other.
B. Where Should the Laws Be Made?
The academic attack on the U.C.C. drafting process has centered
on the identification of the interest groups that participate in the
process and those that are excluded, and how the private lawmaking
process reacts to these groups. The groups that have a comparative
advantage in influencing NCCUSL and the ALI are then seen as
attempting to mold the final product to suit their own ends as opposed
to those of society at large. In particular, the Article 9 revision
process has been characterized as being unduly influenced by
commercial lenders who seek to promote a norm of secured credit
in Tentative Draft of Proposed Revisions to Articles 3 and 4 (Apr. 15, 2002).
65. On the lack of consumer protection provisions in Articles 3 and 4, see
Rubin, supra note 5; on the difficulties faced by consumer groups in the current
Article 2 revision process, see Gail Hillebrand, What's Wrong with the Uniform
Law Process, 52 Hastings L.J. 631 (2001). On the lack on consumer input into the
revised Article 9, see Janger, supra note 17, at 572 ("[T]he Proposed Final Draft
does nothing to make secured credit safer for consumers." Id.).
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uber allies.66 On this public choice view, the seemingly endless
Article 2 revision process represents the inconclusive struggle
between business groups seeking almost complete freedom of
contract and consumer groups attempting to place limits, or at least
impediments, on certain contracting practices.67 Added to this,
Articles 4 and 4A have always been seen as the result of heavy
lobbying by banks seeking to curb any duties owed to their
customers.
It is one thing to diagnose a problem; it is quite another to find a
cure. Transferring responsibility for drafting commercial law from
NCCUSL and the ALI to another institution or set of institutions will
not remove the incentives of interest groups to procure legislation
that they favor. Groups will seek to further their conception of
appropriate public policy regardless of the arena in which the
decision is made. If decisions are made by judges, interest groups
will participate in the judicial selection process and try to influence
judges through amicus briefs. If authority rests in the state
legislatures, lobbying will take place there. If the federal government
sets the rules, groups will travel to Gucci Gulch. This is not to say
that interest groups will necessary have the same influence in every
venue; rather, the point is that one cannot eliminate the effect of
interest groups on the subject matter covered by the Uniform
Commercial Code by simply transferring rule making authority from
NCCUSL and the ALl to another institution. The ultimate question
is which institution will produce better laws.6"
To decide which institution will produce better laws, one has to
compare their respective flaws. In particular, one has to identify how
interest group pressures play out in different institutional settings.
Moreover, one needs to ascertain the goals of the laws in question.
It is one thing to predict whether or not an interest will succeed in
procuring legislation in one setting as opposed to another. It is a
different matter to judge whether or not the law that is enacted is
normatively desirable.
How these matters play out in the context of the subject matter
currently governed by the U.C.C. is a complex matter. As noted
above, the U.C.C. itself covers a variety of areas, with different
interest groups interested in different areas. This essay continues the
work on comparative political economy begun by others in large part
66. See Janger, supar note 17, at 617-25; Robert E. Scott, Is Article 2 the Best
We Can Do?, 52 Hastings L.J. 677, 681 (2001).
67. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 16, at 645-47; Scott, supra note 2 ("The
outcome of the Article revision process was predictable. Indeed, it was predicted."
Id.).
68. See Janger, supra note 17, at 626.
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by pointing out the benefits of the uniform law process that are too
easily overlooked.
In assessing where responsibility for establishing the legal rules
for commercial law should lie, it is first helpful to identify the
relevant interest groups who can affect the legislative product. The
next step is to identify the potential forums to which responsibility
could be assigned for handling commercial law. Each forum has a
different structure, and brings a different set of resources to bear on
the problem. Next, an examination of the appropriate goals for
commercial law is necessary. With the players, the forum, and the
goals in mind, the costs and benefits of the current system can be
compared to plausible alternatives.
1. The Players
The most obvious interest groups who attempt to affect the
content of commercial law are those groups directly affected by the
law in the applicable area. In the case of the U.C.C., this differs
Article by Article. Banks tend to be most concerned with Articles 3
and 4 to the extent that they govern checks and the check collection
process, Article 4A on wire fund transfers, Article 5 on letters of
credit, and Article 9 on secured transactions. Indeed, the influence
of the banking industr has been widely noted in the drafting of each
of these provisions. 9  Of course, banks themselves are not
necessarily a homogenous lot. For example, national money center
banks have a much greater interest in letter of credit rules than do
smaller, more local banks. Moreover, banks are not coextensive with
lenders. Many lenders, such as GE Capital, are not banks. Thus,
Article 9 attracts the interest of asset-based lenders, only some of
whom are banks.
Another potential interest group that may spend resources to
shape the content of law is the business community. Sales of goods
tend to involve either one or two businesses; letters of credit are
generally procured by businesses as opposed to consumers; secured
borrowing is a major source of financing for many firms. It is thus
no surprise that business groups repeatedly appear in the past and
current history of the U.C.C. Attorneys representing manufacturing
69. See Frederick K. Beutel, The Proposed Uniform [?] Commercial Code
Should Not Be Adopted, 61 Yale L.J. 334 (1952) (bank influence in drafting
Articles 3 and 4); Rubin, supra note 5, at 558-59 (bank interest in Articles 3, 4 and
4A); James J. White, The Influence of International Practice on the Revision of
Article 5 of the U.C.C., 16 Nw. J.Int'l L. & Bus. 189 (1995) [hereinafter "White,
International Practice"] (describing drafting of revised Article 5); sources in supra
note 62 (role of lenders in Article 9 drafting process).
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interests played crucial roles in the initial drafting of the U.C.C.7°
Today, business interests play a high profile role in the ongoing
struggle over the amendment of Article 2."' Businesses routinely sell
goods, and they have an interest in the extent to which Article 2
constrains their ability to write certain contracts.
A third group affected by at least some of the provisions of the
U.C.C. is consumers. The extent to which the interests of consumers
are implicated varies across the U.C.C. Consumers routinely buy
goods and engage in checking relationships with banks. Consumers,
however, are not affected by many of the provisions of the U.C.C.
They are rarely involved with letters of credit or negotiable documents
of title. Similarly, they tend to have little direct experience with
Article 8. As to Article 9, the granting of a security interest does not
account for a majority of asset-based consumer debt. Consumers grant
security interests most often in their houses and their cars. House
mortgages do not fall within the scope of Article 9, and car liens are
handled primarily by state certificate of title laws rather than by
Article 9. Moreover, when a consumer buys a product on which there
is a security interest in the ordinary course of business, they take the
item free from the security interest.72
At times, consumers do grant security interests in the goods that
they purchase. For example, a purchaser who uses a Sears credit card
gives Sears a purchase money security interest in the items bought.73
Consumers thus have an interest in the regulation of collection
activities by secured creditors.
While consumers obviously are affected by some of the U.C.C.
provisions, it is far from clear as to who is an appropriate
representative of their interests. Banks and businesses hire their own
representatives and can monitor their performance. Consumers on the
other hand, must rely on self-appointed agents to guard their interests.
These agents no doubt view themselves as advancing consumer
welfare. What benefits consumers, however, is far from clear.74
There is no mechanism that ensures that consumer groups lobby for
positions that, in the long run, increase consumer well-being.
70. See Kamp, supra note 6, at 384-85.
71. Scott, Rise and Fall, supra note 2.
72. See U.C.C. § 9-320 (2000).
73. See In re Carlos, 215 B.R. 52 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1997).
74. Consider, for example, the debate over the enforcement of standard form
contracts. Some view such contracts with deep suspicion, see, e.g., Todd D.
Rakeoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L. Rev.
1174 (1983), while others believe that they often provide benefits for consumers,
see, e.g., Richard Craswell, Property Rules andLiabilityRules in Unconscionability
and Related Doctrines, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1(1993); Douglas G. Baird, Commercial
Norms and The Fine Art of The Small Con: Comments on Daniel Keating's
'Exploring the Battle of the Forms In Action', 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2716 (2000).
11192002]
0LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Putting aside the degree to which consumers suffer an agency
cost in their representation by consumer groups, consumer groups
tend to have a relatively modest impact on the U.C.C. drafting
process. For example, while consumer groups pressed for what they
perceived as consumer protection measures in the revised Article 9,
the eventual comprise between consumer groups on the one hand and
industry representatives on the other left matters essentially how they
were in the old Article 975
To be sure, there is another way in which all persons, including
consumers, can be affected by Article 9, specifically, Article 9's
extant treatment of involuntary creditors. General state law treats
involuntary creditors who have yet to record a judgment as
unsecured creditors. Moreover, once an involuntary creditor records
a judgment, her priority dates from that act. In a world of "first in
time, first in right," the general upshot of this treatment is that
involuntary creditors will take a back seat to any secured lender. A
good bit of ink has been spilled in determining the ways in which
this treatment is viewed as inefficient or unfair. These concerns,
however, have not spurred on any interest group, save the one
discussed next.
Perhaps the most interesting (at least to an academic) interest
group in the law creation process is legal academics.76 The
attractiveness of having academics involved in the drafting process
is twofold. First, drafting is a public good. Most legislative bodies
at the state level do not have the resources to have a staff of experts
to craft proposed legislation. Indeed, some states do not even have
legislators who work full time. Much of the legislative product thus
has to be produced by outsiders." Even Congress and administrative
agencies, which have staff available to draft legislation and
administrative rules, respectively, do not have the time to devote to
drafting and redrafting proposed provisions so that they are user
friendly.7 Legislation is put together by multiple drafters at
75. See Janger, supra note 17, at 612-14.
76. Schwartz and Scott divide the world a bit differently, noting that law
reformers participate in the uniform law making process, and such reformers are
often academics. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 16, at 607. While there
certainly have been reform minded law professors involved in the U.C.C. process,
it is far from clear that all academics involved have pushed for reform. See also
Clayton P. Gillette, Politics and Revision: A Comment on Scott, 80 Va. L. Rev.
1853, 1860 n. 18 [hereinafter "Gillette"] (noting that academics may be concerned
more with getting the U.C.C. adopted than with reform).
77. Ribstein and Kobayashi find that part-time legislatures are more likely to
adopt uniform laws proposed by NCCUSL than are full-time legislatures. See
Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 16, at 187.
78. Indeed, it is a common practice for Congress to pass "technical
amendments" shortly after legislation has been enacted. These amendments correct
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multiple stages.79 Legislation is often amended on the floor of the
House or Senate. Political compromises are often struck behind
closed doors at House-Senate conferences. The press of time and
the need for ambiguity to produce a passable bill often results in
vague statutory language. 0
Producing first-class legislation, or a statute that is technically
sound, is an expensive and time-consuming process. The U.C.C.
drafting process relies to a large extent on volunteers to compose the
various provisions of the U.C.C. This lack of direct remuneration
may lead one to expect the quality of the work will be less than
optimal. Certainly, practicing lawyers often participate in the
drafting process, but they have a relatively high opportunity cost.
Time spent on drafting projects lessens the time spent on projects for
which attorneys and their firms receive direct compensation. Lawyer
salaries are more often based on the amount of business they bring in
and the amount of billable hours they produce. The ability of top-
flight attorneys to participate in the laborious details of drafting
legislation is thus fairly constrained.
The opportunity costs for academics of participating in the
drafting process, however, are much less than those of practicing
lawyers. Typically, academics receive a fixed salary. Tenure ensures
that the nominal amount of a law professor's salary generally cannot
be reduced. Moreover, law reform work can fall within the stated
obligations of an academic. Most law schools view efforts at law
reform as fulfilling an academic's obligation of either service to the
legal community or scholarship that advances our understanding of
law. It is thus possible for academics to receive some tangible
rewards from their law school for their participation in the drafting
process. At a minimum, they will not be penalized for such efforts.
Thus, relative to other potential contributors, it is cheaper for
academics to participate in the drafting process than it is for
practicing attorneys.
Academics also have non-pecuniary incentives to work on law
reform projects. Law professors by their nature tend to enjoy
thinking systematically about the areas of law that they teach.
Indeed, it is often this desire to examine law from a comprehensive
such oversights as misspelled words, duplicate words and omitted words. The
existence of this practice, which we do not see in the U.C.C. process, suggests that
Congress is less than thorough in crafting its legislation.
79. For an excellent and detailed description oflegislative drafting in Congress,
Yee Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics ofLegislative Drafting: A
Congressional Case Study, 77 NYU L. Rev. 575, 583-93 (2002).
80. See id., at 594-97; Joseph Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with
Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value ofAmbiguity in Statutory Design and
Interpretation, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 627, 640-42 (2002).
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perspective that induces a lawyer to leave practice for the academy.
Working on law reform projects is thus enjoyable' for many.
Moreover, law professors who engage in effective law reform
undoubtedly gamer accolades for their work. They can point out
their handiwork to their students over the years, and they gain a
certain amount of recognition and prestige with the practicing bar.
For many academics, a little recognition and praise go a long way.
Of course, there is a risk that these incentives will produce less
than desirable outcomes. Academics may view the uniform law
process as an opportunity to foist their views on an unsuspecting
world.8' Yet, they do not have a free hand in the process to translate
to the statute books of the various states. Most of the law reform
work of NCCUSL is relatively harmless in that there is little chance
that the proposals will see widespread enactment by the states.
Commercial law is different. Under the current state of affairs, it is
highly likely that a proposed revision to the U.C.C. of which the ALI
and NCCUSL approve will in fact become the law in most
jurisdictions.
This likelihood of enactment constrains the ability of even the
most adventurous academic. 2 Commercial law affects businesses to
a large extent, and they ensure that their interests are represented in
the drafting process. They can thus cabin any impulses that
academics may have toward remaking the world. Indeed, while it is
easy to find criticism of the ALI Restatement projects for departing
too far from extant law,83 the complaint tends not to be leveled at the
U.C.C. revision process. If anything, the complaints of the recent
work on the U.C.C. suggests that it is too conservative and too
beholden to financial interests. Academics simply do not have the
freedom to bend commercial law to their vision of the good.
81. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 16, at 610-11; Erin A. O'Hara & Larry
E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1151,
1183 (2000) ("Law professors stand to gain fame and fortune by advocating
sweeping new theories, and need not bear the costs when these theories go awry."
Id.); Larry E. Ribstein, The Mandatory Nature of the ALI Code, 61 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 984, 1024,30 (1993).
82. The recent efforts to overhaul the Bankruptcy Code provide a vivid
illustration. Congress appointed a commission to propose changes. A number of
prominent bankruptcy scholars spent countless hours drafting what they viewed as
a marked improvement over current law. The commissioners' proposals, especially
in the area of consumer bankruptcy, were far out of step from what Congress was
willing to enact, and the proposals never received serious attention. See also
Gillette, supra note 77.
83. For example, see the following articles criticizing the ALI's ongoing
Restatement of Torts project, John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The
Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 Vand. L. Rev.
657 (2001); Steven Hetcher, Non-Utilitarian Negligence Norms and the Reasonable
Person Standard, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 863 (2001).
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Academics, however, are attractive partners to others involved in
the law creation process. One attractive feature is that they are likely
to produce a high-quality product, when measured from a technical
standpoint. Good statutes cover a myriad of hypothetical situations.
They resolve both the pressing problems of the moment and yet do
not create mischief in other areas. In short, they are not myopic. The
testing of statutory language through a barrage of hypotheticals is the
academics' stock and trade. They tend to instruct law students by
creating new hypotheticals that force the students to test the limits of
the extant legal materials. Thus, one would expect that academics
would be able to provide a relatively high level of technical expertise.
Another attraction of academics is that they can add a patina of
respectability to the process. Academics, while they undoubtedly
have their own normative biases, do not come shackled to any client.
Indeed, they often care deeply about the law at issue rather than
advancing the interests of any particular party that may be affected
by the law. They truly want to get it right. They may well be seen
as public-spirited individuals who are not beholden to any interest
group. It is thus not surprising that academics have in the past played
major parts in drafting the extant versions of the U.C.C. All U.C.C.
revision projects have an academic that serves as the reporter.84
2. The Competitors
Most simply, lawmaking in the United States can take place
either at the state or national level. At both levels, the process of
producing legal rules can take on of two forms. At the state level,
each state may enact what it views as the best law. Perhaps the most
prominent private law area where this occurs is legislation that sets
the parameters for the internal governance of firms. States are seen
as competing against each other for incorporations, and there is
substantial literature on whether this competition promotes
efficiency.8" One possibility is to create a market for regulatory
84. The attraction of academics is not limited to the U.C.C. Twice in the last
30 years Congress has created a commission to propose substantial revisions of the
then current bankruptcy law. Both times, an academic was selected as reporter for
the commission, with Frank Kennedy of the Michigan Law School serving as
reporter in the 1970s and Elizabeth Warren of the Harvard Law School serving as
the reporter in the 1990s.
85. Standard cites in this literature include William L. Cary, Federalism and
Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 88 Yale L.J. 663 (1974) (setting forth
the "race to the bottom" thesis); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. Legal Stud. 251 (1977) (setting
forth the "race to the top" thesis); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the
Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105
Harv. L. Rev. 1435 (1992) (arguing that on some aspects of corporate law race will
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competition for all or some of the areas currently covered by the
U.C.C.6 -
A second way in which states can enact commercial legislation
is through the current process. 7 The Permanent Editorial Board for
the Uniform Commercial Code is made up of members of both the
ALl and the NCCUSL. When it believes that a revision of the U.C.C.
is needed, the Permanent Editorial Board forwards such a
recommendation to the ALI and the NCCUSL, who then consider the
recommendation. If the leadership of the ALL and the NCCUSL
decide to go forward, they then form a drafting committee. The
committee produces a draft, which is then submitted to the NCCUSL
and the ALL for separate approval. If both organizations approve the
draft, it goes to the states. In between drafts, the Permanent Editorial
Board is charged with issuing commentary on interpretative issues
that arise. For example, when the Tenth Circuit sent fear into the
hearts of the securitization industry with its decision in Orctagon
Gas,88 the Permanent Editorial Board quickly issued a commentary
condemning the decision. 9
The federal level also has two methods by which legal rules can
be promulgated. Congress, of course, is one potential candidate for
making commercial law. Indeed, it currently enacts the law that
governs corporate reorganizations in bankruptcy.90 Given its lack of
activity in other areas of commercial law, it is something of a guess
as to how Congress would go about producing a federal commercial
code. In the bankruptcy area, the practice has been to establish a
commission to draft proposed legislation. The work of the
tend toward the top, while on others it will tend toward the bottom); Roberta
Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, I J.L. Econ.
& Org. 225 (1985) (trying to answer the question of whether Delaware law is
efficient through an event study); Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve
Firm Value?, J. Fin. Econ. (2001) (using Tobin's Q to see whether Delaware law
adds value). Recent work questions just how vigorously the states compete, see
Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:
Reconsidering the Debate on State Competition over Corporate Charters,__ Yale
L.J. _ (forthcoming 2002); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State
Competition in Corporate Law, _ Stan. L. Rev. _ (forthcoming 2002).
86. See Janger, supra note 17, at 588-93.
87. For a more detailed description of this process, see Patchel, supra note 17,
at 88-93, Scott, supra note 17, at 1803-06.
88. Octagon Gas Systems, Inc. v. Rimmer, 995 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1993).
89. See PEB Commentary No. 14.
90. David Skeel has questioned whether Congress should retain the primary
responsibility for enacting corporate bankruptcy law or whether this task should be
devolved to the states. See David A. Skeel, Jr. Rethinking the Line Between
Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 471 (1994). Skeel
believes that, as with corporate law generally, states should formulate bankruptcy
law outside of the uniform law process.
1124 [Vol. 62
ROBERT K. RASMUSSEN
Bankruptcy Commission of the 1970s heavily influenced the final
legislation that became the Bankruptcy Code in 1978."' The most
recent Bankruptcy Commission, however, had little effect on the
current debate over changing federal law. Its proposed revisions of the
Code, especially as they related to consumer bankruptcies, were pretty
much ignored by Congress. The bills that Congress has considered in
the last few legislative sessions were seemingly drafted by creditor
groups. Indeed, much has been written on the extensive lobbying of
the credit card industry in favor of making it more difficult for
individuals to discharge their debts in bankruptcy.
Congress, of course, is not the only actor at the federal level.
Administrative agencies often exercise considerable sway over a
number of areas. In the commercial law context, the Federal Reserve
Board basically removed the check collection process from the domain
of the U.C.C.9 ' The Federal Trade Commission enacted provisions to
regulate practices that would otherwise be allowed by the U.C.C.
Perhaps the two most prominent restrictions are the FTC's elimination
of the holder in due course concept from consumer transactions,93 and
its ban on taking a security interests in household goods that the lender
did not finance.94 Given this extant administrative regulation in the
commercial law area, one could imagine assigning even a greater
jurisdiction to the appropriate administrative agencies.
Each of these four primary ways to produce legislation differs in
its available tools.95 For example, legislatures have the ability to solve
conflicts through log rolling. A legislator can propose a solution where
her view of desirable legislation prevails on one piece of legislation in
exchange for her supporting a different piece of legislation. While
there certainly can be comprises in the U.C.C. drafting process, they do
not cut across subject areas. Indeed, they are not even trades across
U.C.C. articles. Consumer groups cannot offer banks greater leeway
in Article 9 in order to garner their support for more consumer
protections in Article 2. Thus, in order to get agreement, the drafters
can either pass vague rules that do not resolve the issue, 96 or, when
they are revising an extant article, they can stay with the status quo.97
91. See Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 47 (1997).
92. See supra notes 62-64.
93. See 16 C.F.R. § 433.2(a) (2001).
94. See 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(4) (2001).
95. Some of these differences are referred to in Schwartz & Scott, supra note
16; Alan Schwartz suggested others when commenting on an earlier version of this
essay.
96. This is Bob Scott's and Alan Schwartz's explanation for the vagueness of
Article 2.
97. As happened with consumer protection initiatives and the recent Article 9
revision process. See Janger, supra note 17, at 612-15; see also Edward J. Janger,
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The inability of the uniform law process to resolve conflicts is
exacerbated by the nature of the "legislators.'9 '8  Final
decision-making authority rests with the membership of the
NCCUSL and the ALl. Whereas the members of the NCCUSL are
drawn for their interest in uniforms laws, of which the U.C.C. is the
most successful, the general members of the ALI have little reason to
spend a good deal of time considering the U.C.C. The ALI attracts
members. from a variety of backgrounds, many of which are far
removed from the intricacies of commercial law.99 When confronted
with the demands of conflicting interest groups, as they were in the
case of the revised Article 2, these members are likely to opt for the
status quo. They have no institutional resources that can assist them
in evaluating the competing assertions of the interest groups, and they
receive little benefit from taking sides in a contentious dispute. As
Bob Scott and Alan Schwartz have pointed out, one may thus expect
that a status quo bias may exist in such a legislature.
An additional difference between public and private lawmaking
is that public legislatures and administrative agencies have the
potential to gather more information than does the private reform
process."° Both legislatures and agencies have staff that can provide
an independent assessment of the factual claims of competing
proposals. For example, both the Federal Reserve Board and the
Federal Trade Commission employ a number of economists. They
can thus provide information to the actual decision-maker that would
simply be unavailable to the members of the ALI and the NCCUSL
who actually vote on the final version of the U.C.C. This lack of
information by which they can resolve competing factual assertions
as to the effect of a given proposal is yet another reason as to why the
members of the ALI and the NCCUSL may have a preference for the
status quo more so than would a public legislature.''
The inability of the uniform law process to resolve conflicting
claims may or may not be a detriment. Much will depend on how
one views the competing claims at issue, the desirability of the status
quo, and how one expects both private actors and courts to act
without additional guidance. That said, there are some clear
advantages that the private law process has over its competitors. The
The Locus of Lawmaking: Uniform State Law, Federal Law and Bankruptcy
Reform, 74 Am. Bank. L.J. 97 (2000) (pointing out structural reasons in U.C.C.
process for status quo bias).
98. See Schawartz & Scott, supra note 16, at 596-98.
99. For example, colleagues on my faculty who are members of the ALI
include prominent constitutional, tort, tax and corporate law scholars. None have
any significant interest in commercial law.
100. Whether they actually use these sources is, of course, another matter.
101. See Schwartz.& Scott, supra note 16, at 621-37.
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products of the uniform law process tend to be more complete than
the products produced either by state legislatures or Congress. Both
are likely to cover many of the problems in the area and are done at
a high level of technical expertise. There are a few reasons for this.
One, discussed above, is that drafters in the uniform law process
probably take more time with their handiwork. Moreover, federal
legislation tends to take place against a backdrop of extant state
regulation. If the federal regulation is not comprehensive, the state
will fill in the gaps.
The uniform law process also has the potential to reduce the
payments made to public legislators by the various interest groups.
Getting on the agenda of a public legislature requires effort.
Legislatures have budget constraints, and legislators cannot address
all of the problems that some interest groups believe should be
attended to. To be sure, some issues are so salient to the public that
they will undoubtedly receive the attention of lawmakers. However,
for other matters, interest groups may have to grab the attention of
the lawmaker in order to garner consideration. One can get a
legislator's attention either through the campaign
process-contributions--or through the ability to deliver votes. For
areas covered by the U.C.C., amendments by and large will receive
consideration by the legislature. Morever, there will be a natural
reluctance on the part of state legislatures to deviate from the
proposed text of the U.C.C. at the behest of an interest group.
In situations where there are reasons to believe that the uniform
law process will produce a resolution of legal issues at least as
consistent with the public interest as would a public legislature,
responsibility should be assigned to the private legislature. First,
doing so allows the public legislature to devote its limited time to
consider other areas. Second, such an assignment reduces the cost
of having the law enacted.
Perhaps most importantly, state lawmaking in a private
legislature does not preclude targeted federal intervention.
Administrative agencies can, and indeed have, modified the results
of the U.C.C. when they concluded that it was necessary to do so.
Thus, the relevant question is not private legislators versus federal
lawmakers. Rather, the question is private legislatures subject to
federal oversight as opposed to federal action alone. Given that the
extant U.C.C. process can produce some benefits, one needs to do
more than saying that federal law making may be superior along
some dimensions. Retaining primary authority in the states allows
for the creation of superior technical statutory language, and allows
for the federal government, especially administrative agencies, to
intercede ina narrow fashion once they conclude that such
intervention is warranted.
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C. Preliminary Thoughts on What Should Go Where
In assessing the attraction of the extant U.C.C. process as
compared with its potential replacements, the threshold issue is the
importance of uniformity. To the extent that uniformity is a
normatively attractive goal, this would lead one to shy away from
having law produced on a state-by-state basis without some
coordinating mechanism. It seems unlikely that one could achieve
uniform state law absent a coordinating mechanism. There is no
reason to think that legislators in North Dakota would happen upon
the same set of rules governing secured transactions as would
legislators in New York. The very creation of an organization
designed to serve this coordinating function suggests that, at least in
the past, laws among the various states have diverged.
The experience in corporate law bears this out. While Delaware
achieved a clear victory in the market for corporate charters, this
victory has not led to uniformity in corporate governance. 2
Presently, roughly half of the nation's public corporations are not
incorporated in Delaware. Regulatory competition is thus not likely
to create a uniform system of laws. Uniformity is more likely to arise
from either federal legislation or private legislatures designated to
draft a uniform law than it is from ad hoc state enactments.
The current arrangement prizes uniformity. Perhaps the biggest
normative commitment of the U.C.C. is the need for uniformity." 3
This desire for uniformity has pervaded the drafting process. Indeed,
that it is the point of the entire project.
This commitment raises at least two questions. The first is when
should our legal system aspire to ensure that the same law applies in
all fifty states. As we saw in Part H, some areas of commercial law,
notably land contracts, service contracts, and real estate mortgages,
remain nonuniform. Are these areas of law suffering from an
immense flaw, or is there a theory to explain which laws require
uniformity and which work best via state-by-state variation? Second,
once one concludes that a certain area of law should be uniform,
when should this uniformity be provided at the state level via the
102. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms' Decisions Where to
Incorporate (Jan. 2002 working paper) available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/
faculty/bebchuk/papers.shtml (last visited Nov. 11, 2002).
103. Indeed, the recent enactment of the revised Article 9 shows the sway the
concerns for uniformity have. The drafters of the Revised Article 9 issued a
statement with a parade of horribles that would result were the country to have old
Article 9 in force in some states and the new Article 9 in others. Whether or not
this struck fear in the hearts of legislators across the country, the fact is that the new
Article 9 went into effect across the nation virtually simultaneously.
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uniform law process rather than at the national level via legislation
or agency action?
Uniformity is not necessarily an obvious goal. One has to
distinguish between uniformity and certainty. Certainty has long
been a primary goal of commercial law. Commercial law professors
for years have been telling their students that businesses prefer a clear
rule to a correct rule. The basic intuition here is that parties to a
transaction want to know where they stand. They want to be able to
predict exactly what may happen if they engage in a certain course of
conduct. Moreover, if a dispute arises regarding a transaction, the
more certain the law, the less likely we will need litigation to resolve
that dispute."° When the law is uncertain, parties are more likely to
have differing views on the outcome of litigation, and these
differences may prevent the parties from settling the dispute without
recourse to the judicial process. Certainty thus seems to have a clear
value, but its link with uniformity is tenuous.
In exploring the relationship between certainty and uniformity,
one must look at each area of law covered by the U.C.C. As
discussed earlier, the U.C.C. is more a collection of related statutes
than it is a comprehensive code. Moreover, once one moves beyond
the theme of uniformity which unites the Code project, one finds
different substantive goals for each area of law covered by the U.C.C.
There is no reason to expect that the goals served by contract law are
the same as those served by the check collection process.
1. Articles 4A, 5, 6, 7 and 8
Perhaps the easiest set of provisions to discuss are those
contained in Articles 4A, 5, 6, 7, and 8. These five articles have
remained relatively immune from the recent wave of scholarship
exploring the interest group dynamics of the Uniform Commercial
Code law-making process. r s The reason for this lack of scrutiny is
easy to understand. Given the subject areas that these articles cover,
one would not expect the uniform law process to deviate from the
public interest any more than would a public legislature. In these
settings the extant process works well and should be retained.
104. Not everyone agrees that certainty induces more efficient bargains. See Ian
Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomanic Bargaining; Dividing a Legal Entitlement to
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 Yale L.J. 1027 (1995); Jason Scott Johnston,
Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, 11 J.L. Econ. & Org. 256 (1995).
105. But see Francis J. Facciolo, Father Knows Best: Revised Article 8 and the
Individual Investor, 27 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 615 (2000) (arguing that the securities
industry dominated the drafting process for revised Article 8 to the detriment of the
individual investor).
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The key to understanding the lack of controversy that these
articles have generated is the fact that all affected parties are capable
of participating in the law revision process, and that process is able
to accommodate all of their views. Three of these articles involve
payment mechanisms operated by commercial banks and used almost
exclusively by sophisticated commercial parties. Article 4A covers
wire fund transfers, Article 5 handles letters of credit, and Article 7
deals with warehouse receipts, which are often part of a financing
transaction where the buyer's bank lends against a negotiable
document of title. "6 These transactions, at least from the perspective
of the drafting process, have two salient features for our purposes.
The first is that all of the parties tend to be sophisticated market
actors; these are the type of entities that can ensure that their interests
are brought to the attention of the commercial law drafting process.
To the extent that one is concerned that the drafting process may
produce rules that deviate from the public interest because the
affected parties have unequal input into the process, that concern
does not exist here.
The second feature of these transactions is that many businesses
will find themselves playing different roles in different transactions.
A business could send or receive a wire fund transfer, it could be the
applicant for or beneficiary of a letter of credit, and it could be a
consignor or a consignee for goods covered by a negotiable document
of title. Given that many businesses repeatedly find themselves on
both ends of the transaction, they may tend to be more concerned
with the responsibility of banks than with rules that attempted to
skew matters in favor of one of the non-bank parties to the
transaction.
Most importantly, from the standpoint of public policy, there is
no reason to conjecture that the rules produced by the U.C.C. drafting
process would deviate more from the public interest than would rules
drafted by a public legislature. All the affected parties are repeat
players that, if they wish, can have input into the legislative process.
The rules that are ultimately decided upon will be known to those
who use them. To the extent that a rule imposes costs on one party,
it can effectively take this rule into account via the price of the
transaction. Thus, the parties will lean toward rules that keep the
price of the payment system down.
Rather than plod through the history of these five articles one by
one, Article 5 will be offered as an example. Article 5 covers letters
of credit. A letter of credit transaction typically involves three
parties-the issuing bank; the applicant, which is generally the
106. See Ronald J. Mann, Payment Systems and Other Financial Transactions
Assignment 26 (1999).
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customer of the issuing bank; and the beneficiary. 07 The applicant
and the beneficiary typically are sophisticated commercial actors.
These are precisely the type of entities that fare well in the uniform
law process.
One would expect all affected parties to participate in the drafting
of rules for letters of credit. However, one would not expect
excessive rancor among the participants in letter of credit transactions
over the substance of those rules. A letter of credit transaction is one
in which there are few externalities. Increasing the risk that a letter
of credit will be dishonored, and the beneficiary will not receive the
funds on which it counted, is the type of risk that can be priced in the
underlying deal between the customer and the beneficiary.
Moreover, any commercial actor is likely to find itself being an
applicant in some cases, and a beneficiary in others. Thus, the
commercial actors are more concerned with the overall efficacy of
the letter of credit rules than any redistribution between applicant and
beneficiary. Indeed, it appears that commercial actors, other than
banks, played little active role in the most recent revision of Article
5. 108
Banks, however, care deeply about Article 5. The motivation for
this does not seem to be that they cannot price any risk that they bear.
Increasing the risk that the bank will have to pay on a letter and not
receive reimbursement from its customer is a risk that can be priced
into the letter of credit transaction. Rather, the concern of American
banks is that they have to compete with banks across the world for
business. Most major commercial banks outside of the United States
follow the Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits,
which is published by the International Chamber of Commerce.
American bankers believed that forcing them to adhere to old Article
5 would put them at a competitive disadvantage. In the revision
process, American banks heavily lobbied the drafting committee to
move the U.C.C. closer to the UCP. Indeed, the final product was a
new Article 5 that was much closer in substance to the UCP than was
its predecessor.
As a result, the banks got their way. This result is consistent with
the prediction of Schwartz and Scott that when there is a single
interest group involved in the U.C.C. revision process, the result will
be a relatively clear set of rules amenable to the wishes of that group.
While one may pause to endorse such a result where a party, who will
be affected by the rules and who was also shut out of the drafting
107. For an overview of a letter of credit transaction, see Mann, supra note 107,
at Assignment 13.
108. For a history of the revision process of Article 5, see James G. Barnes,
Internationalization of Revised U C.C. Article 5 (Letters of Credit), 16 NW J. Int'l
L. & Bus. 215 (1995); White, supra note 70.
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process, such caution is not warranted when the single group bears the
costs and benefits of the legislation. In the case of Article 5, the
American banks wanted to adhere to the same rules as their
competitors. The U.C.C. process generated this result.
There are minor differences in the drafting histories of some of the
other articles. For example, bank customers were more active in the
Article 4A process. They were concerned that the original proposal
placed too little responsibility on the banks. These concerns were
eventually ameliorated through a compromise between the
representatives of the banks and the representatives of the customers.
Nevertheless, the basic pattern remains the same. All of the affected
parties had access to the drafting process, and, in the commercial
setting where these rules had to operate, no one party had a strategic
advantage over another. In these circumstances, one would expect
little divergence between the outcome of the U.C.C. drafting process
and the public interest. Given that, as discussed above, the private law
process both conserves public legislative resources and relieves the
affected groups from having to get on the legislative agenda.
Responsibility for handling the subject matter covered by these articles
should continue to reside in the ALI and NCCUSL.
Article 6 is a much more interesting situation. The most recent
revision of Article 6 engendered a clash among three different interest
groups-unsecured lenders, secured lenders and auctioneers." 9 The
uniform law process was unable to resolve this conflict. It did not,
however, do nothing. Rather, it drafted two versions of a revised
Article 6, one that would repeal the statute in its entirety and one that
would update the statute. As it turned out, most states took the former
option. The process added value, however, in that it clearly framed the
issue for the states-repeal or no repeal. To be sure, a state could
always repeal Article 6 on its own. But the official sanctioning of that
option by the ALl and NCCUSL probably made the state legislatures
more alert that they were faced with a policy choice in this area.
In sum, there are areas where the uniform law process for
promulgating commercial law adds value to the overall lawmaking
system. The remainder of this essay examines the extent to which this
conclusion is obtainable for those other areas of the U.C.C. that have
come under attack, Articles 2, 3, 4 and 9.
2. Article 2
Article 2 has always been central to the Uniform Commercial
Code. Llewellyn deemed it the "heart and soul" of the project."' Yet,
109. See Peter Winship, Lawmaking and Article 6 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 41 Ala. L. Rev. 673 (1990).
110. Karl Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 Fla. L.
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whereas it is easy to see why the law benefits from uniformity in
areas such as the check collection system and secured transactions,
perhaps the area of the law where the connection between certainty
and uniformity is the most opaque is the sale of goods. After all, the
rest of contract law seems to survive by adhering to the common law.
Indeed, in a series of recent articles, including one in this
Symposium, Bob Scott has made a powerful argument that the
Article 2 project should be abandoned, and sales be reunited with the
rest of contract law and administered through the common law.
Common law, of course, varies across jurisdictions. It is not
uniform. Even if one can conclude what the majority of common law
courts do with an issue, there will often be divergence among the
jurisdictions."' When one talks about "the common law rule" or,
better still, "the traditional common law approach," there is a tacit
understanding that one is speaking about what most courts would do
rather than speaking about how every court would approach the
problem. Thus, the choice here is not between the U.C.C. rule and
the common rule; rather, the choice is between the U.C.C. rule and
a variety of common law rules.
In this setting, the connection between uniformity and certainty
at least in the case of parties who are well informed about the law," i
depends in large measure on the enforceability of choice of law
clauses. To the extent that law permits broad enforcement of such
clauses, it is easy for firms to procure certainty even though states
differ in their substantive law.
To see this point, assume that a firm does business in many states.
The firm is located in New York and sells goods in all fifty states.
Assume further that each state were responsible for its sales of goods
Rev. 367, 378 (1957).
111. For example, Bob Scott finds the traditional common law approach to
interpretation to be one that focuses intensively on the written contract itself. See
Scott, supra note 17, at 162-63. It is not hard, of course, to find courts that depart
from this method. For example, see Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas
Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968); Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561
(Cal. 1968); Hatley v. Stafford, 588 P.2d 603 (Or. 1978). The Restatement(Second) of Contracts generally endorses this approach. See Restatement (Second)
of Contracts §§ 209-216.
112. The question about the extent to which parties are well informed about the
law is one on which there is much disagreement. Compare William J. Woodward,
Contractual Choice of Law: Legislative Choice in the Era of Party Autonomy, 54
SMU L. Rev. 697, 760-62 (2001) (many parties are not well informed) with Paul
B. Stephan, Regulatory Cooperation and Competition: The Search for Virtue, in
Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation: Legal Problems and Political Prospects 191-
192 (George A. Berman, et al., eds., 2000). Of course, not everyone has to be well
informed to support a competitive market for contract terms. See Alan Schwartz
& Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information:
A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 630 (1979).
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law; in other words, there were no efforts made at achieving
uniformity across the states. This situation seemingly has the
potential to subject the New York firm to fifty different sets of
contract law. Such a possibility could well lead one to conclude that
a uniform sales act is necessary. The firm faces two distinct costs.
One is the cost of uncertainty. Conflict-of-law rules are notoriously
vague. "3 It is often not possible to say in advance of litigation which
state's law will apply. Thus, were the CEO of the New York firm to
ask her general counsel as to which law would govern in the case of
dispute over a sale that was completed in California and the dispute
arose in Oregon, perhaps the most accurate answer she could give
would be "Your guess is as good as mine." Even if this situation
were improved by crafting a clear set of conflict of law rules," 4 a cost
is still associated with multiple laws, the cost of learning the various
laws that apply to different states. Even if the hypothetical firm
could ascertain exactly, quickly, and cheaply which state's laws
governed which contract, it would still incur the cost of learning the
ins and outs of each state's laws. Thus, the case of the single firm
dealing in multiple jurisdictions seems to be the strongest case for
needing a uniform sales law.
Things are not necessarily as bad as it seems, however. Those
who make contracts on behalf of the firm can foresee the uncertainty
engendered by the choice of law rules and attempt to settle the matter
by contract. As Coase taught us long ago, the cost of any legal rule
is capped by the cost of contracting around it. The firm in this case
has the ability to avoid being subject to myriad contract laws via a
choice of law clause in all of its contracts. The New York firm could
insert in each of its contracts a provision that any dispute will be
governed by the laws of New York. To the extent that such a clause
would be enforced, the firm would achieve the desired certainty even
in the absence of a uniform law. It would know which law applied
and could limit the cost of having to learn multiple sets of laws.
To be sure, the potential use of choice of law clauses will not
eliminate all costs associated with varying state laws. Not all
contracting parties may recognize that they need to include a choice
of law clause. Here, the lack of uniformity may create ex post
uncertainty when a dispute arises. Moreover, reliance on choice of
113. The classic quote describes the field as "a dismal swamp, filled with
quaking quagmires, and inhabited by learned but eccentric professors who theorize
about mysterious matters in strange and incomprehensible jargon." William
Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 959, 971 (1953).
114. Recent attempts to add clarity include Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of
Law, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 277 (1990); Erin A. O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From
Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1151 (2000); Andrew
Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 Georgetown L.J. 883 (2002).
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law clauses may raise contracting costs as compared to a system that
has a uniform law. The parties may spend resources bargaining over
which law should apply.
There also are limits placed on choice of law clauses. Historically,
parties could only choose from those states that had a relationship with
the transaction. Thus, if a New York firm decided that Nevada had the
best law for the sale of goods, it could only select Nevada if some
aspect of the transaction touched Nevada. This is an obvious limit on
competition, a limit that does not exist in the corporate arena, where a
firm is free to incorporate in any state, regardless of where its assets are
located.
To be sure, there has been a recent movement on this front. The
new draft of Article 1 contains a broad choice of law provision in sales
between businesses." 5 If the new Article I is enacted by the states," 6
firms falling under its purview are free to adopt the law they conclude
best meets their needs. Were such freedom of contract generally
followed, it would undoubtedly reduce the potential costs of the
uncertainty created by nonuniform laws. "' It is still the case under the
new Article 1, however, that in transactions involving consumers,
choice of law is constrained."'
Finally, it may be impossible to achieve certainty cheaply and
quickly for all firms by employing choice of law clauses. The
hypothetical New York firm achieves certainty for itself via a choice
of law clause. However, what about its contracting opposites? Every
contract has at least two parties. A buyer in California may buy from
firms all over the country, just as the New York seller ships goods
nationwide. Like the New York firm, it only wants to deal with one set
of laws. It thus insists that all of its contracts have a choice of law
clause establishing California law as governing any future disputes. It
simply is not the case that every firm through adroit use of choice of
law clauses can establish a single jurisdiction to govern its contracts.
The magnitude of this cost depends on one's assumptions as to
how readily all firms will agree on which state's law provides the
115. See U.C.C. § 1-301(b)(1) (2001).
116. New Article 1 has been approved by the ALl and NCCUSL in 2001. As
of November 2002, it had been enacted only in the U.S. Virgin Islands. See
www.NCCUSL.org/uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts fs uccl.asp (last visited
Nov. 2, 2002). Some law professors have objected to the new Article 1 on the
grounds that small businesses should be treated like consumers. See William J.
Woodward, Jr., "Sale" of Law and Forum and the Widening Gulf Between
"Consumer" and "Nonconsumer" Contracts in the U. C. C., 75 Wash. U.L.Q. 243
(1997).
117. It is a bit ironic that we could end in a world where there is more freedom
in choice of law clauses in an area governed by a uniform law than in an area
governed by disparate laws.
118. See U.C.C. § 1-301(d) (2001).
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best contract rules. To the extent that all firms scour the country in
search of the state that offers the laws that best enhance the
contracting surplus, one would predict little disagreement over which
state a choice of law clause should point. On the other hand, if firms
have a preference for the law of the state in which they are located,' " 9
the contracting costs loom larger. Which result is more likely
depends in large part on whether any state has the incentive to create
a legal system that attracts those drafting contracts. The argument
here tracks the now decades old debate in corporate law over the
corporate charter market. The proponents of regulatory competition
in that field note that an American firm can incorporate in any
jurisdiction, and that jurisdiction receives tax benefits from the firm.
Thus, at least some states will attempt to implement a legal regime
attractive to corporations.' The divide is over whether the winner
of the competition will enact laws that promote efficiency or only
enhance managerial prerogatives.
Transplanting the regulatory competition argument to the contract
area is relatively straightforward. To the extent that parties can
choose which law will govern their contract, they will choose the law
that maximizes the total surplus of the contract. Jurisdictions will
thus compete to supply better laws. The problem with the U.C.C.
from this perspective is that it dampens regulatory competition.
Uniformity comes at a cost. All states may have the same law; it
simply may not be a terribly good one.
To assess this argument, it is necessary to understand the best
case where the argument works, the case of the corporation.
Delaware, so the story goes, is in a competition with other states to
provide the law that corporations want. Delaware needs to supply a
better product to win this competition.
Even if one accepts the Delaware competition story,'2' it is
unclear that it can be transplanted to the U.C.C. context. There are
crucial aspects to the Delaware story that are absent in the
commercial law situation. One aspect is that firms have the ability
to cheaply select jurisdictions. Due to the internal affairs doctrine,
firms can simply choose from any of the fifty jurisdictions. They do
119. Certainly the lawyers for the firm may prefer the home state given that they
are more familiar with that state's law.
120. The extent of actual competition has been questioned. See sources cited in
supra note 86.
121. And many do not. In addition to the work questioning the level of state
competition, other work posits that there is a competition, but it is the please
managers rather than promote firm value. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen
Ferrell, Federalism and Takeover Law: The Race to Protect Managers from
Takeovers, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1168 (1999) reprinted in, Regulatory Competition
and Economic Integration, (D. Esty & D. Geradin eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2001).
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not need any party's agreement. The firm's managers can select the
jurisdiction that they think best serves their needs.
This easy ability to specify governing law does not translate into
the commercial law setting. To be sure, courts will generally respect
choice of law clauses. But there are three important ways in which
the contract setting differs from the incorporation setting. The first
difference is the legal ability of firms to select governing law.
Current law limits the ability of contracting parties to select the law
of a jurisdiction that has some relation to the contract. Absent legal
reform, this limitation means that a state cannot compete for all
contracts. It can only compete for that subset that has some relation
to the state. To the extent that a state cannot capture the full benefits
from crafting attractive legal rules, this will lessen the incentive to
create such rules in the first place. In a world where the state cannot
capture the benefit of its efforts, the ability to opt out of a given
state's legal regime is better seen as a limit on the state's ability to
extract rents from the parties rather than regulatory competition
toward a better set of legal rules. 2
This inability to freely select the law governing the contract
means that if sales law returned to the states, some parties could be
left with a set of unattractive jurisdictions from which to choose.
Many legislatures are part time, and are unlikely to produce any
detailed legislation on contract law. For them, the current U.C.C.
process is a way to enact legislation cheaply. They can simply adopt
the work of others. Returning the law of sales to them would
probably put that responsibility on the state judiciary. To be sure, if
one believes that common law judges will always produce better
legal rules than a legislature,"' one would applaud this state of
affairs. To the extent, however, that one concludes that Article 2
represents an improvement over the common law in these states,
jettisoning the current system would be a cost.
A second way in which the contract setting differs from the
corporate one is that there are two parties involved in the contract.
The parties to the contract have to agree on which law is applicable.
This entails costs both in learning the various set of choices and in
selecting the applicable law in every contract. In corporate law, firms
122. Cf Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Contract and Jurisdictional
Freedom, in The Fall and Rise of Freedom of Contract 325 (F.H. Buckley ed.,
1999) (arguing that the ability of parties to use choice of law clause limits attempts
to extract rents from those parties).
123. This implicates the oft-debated question of whether the common law is
efficient. The efficiency-of-common-law doctrine was first put forth by Judge
Posner, see Richard A. Posner, The Economic Analysis of Law 98-102 (1st ed.
1972). For a recent discussion of this issue, see Oona A. Hathaway, Path
Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common
Law System, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 601 (2001).
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only have to compare two jurisdictions. Most firms incorporate
either in the jurisdiction in which they conduct most of their business
or in Delaware. They do not have to examine the law of all fifty
states. The same would not be true in the contract setting. A
contracting opposite may come from any of the fifty states, and may
propose its law as the one to govern disputes. To ascertain which law
maximizes thejoint surplus, the firm will continually be assessing the
quality of law of various jurisdictions.
The third, and potentially most important, reason as why the
corporate analogy does not easily transfer to the contract setting has
to do with the incentives of the states to produce laws. Delaware has
institutional forces that affect the quality of both its legislative and
judicial products. It is a well-known fact that the Delaware state
government derives a significant portion of its operating budget from
the franchise tax that it charges to corporations incorporated in that
state."'24 The threat of losing this source of revenue ensures that the
legislature is attentive to the needs of those firms incorporated in
Delaware. To the extent that one believes that a firm's managers
pick a state of incorporation with an eye toward maximizing the
value of the firm, this pressure tends to induce the Delaware
legislature to enact efficient laws.
Central to this story is the ability of states to charge for the laws
that they provide to every firm. States levy franchise fees on all
firms that are incorporated in the jurisdiction. A state can thus
extract the value of its corporate law through its taxing structure. It
can price its product. Indeed, for publicly held firms, Delaware has
a franchise tax that exceeds that of most other states. 125 Each firm
that avails itself of Delaware law thus has to pay for it.
In addition to the interests of the legislators in Delaware in filling
the fisc is the interest of Delaware attorneys. By all accounts, the
Delaware bar derives significant benefit from the fact that Delaware
is the jurisdiction of choice for most major publicly held firms.
These lawyers thus have the incentive to ensure both that the
legislature does not enact laws that drive corporations away, and that
the Delaware judiciary is stocked with judges that attend to corporate
law. Indeed, the Delaware bench has a norm of providing "service"
to the corporations that bring disputes before it. Delaware's
geography makes it easier for the bar to exercise this influence.
Delaware is a small state, and Wilmington, its capital, is not a very
large town. Thus, to the extent that the legal community has a norm
of being sensitive to the needs of firms in its corporate law, the
124. See Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law (American
Enterprise Institute ed., 1993).
125. See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for
Corporate Law, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 1205 (2001).
1138 [Vol. 62
ROBERT K RASMUSSEN
geography of the state makes it easier to support that norm than
would the geography of many other states.
It is unclear whether regulatory competition could induce states
to compete over contract law. It is hard to see how a state could
institute a pricing structure to collect revenue from each entity that
uses its contract law. A state derives no revenue from firms that
include a choice of law clause in a contract that uses that state's law.
A firm incorporated in Delaware can insert a choice of law clause in
a contract for the sale of goods that specifies that the law of New
York will govern all disputes. New York receives no compensation
for this use of its law. Thus, whereas the Delaware fisc benefits
directly from the legislature's production of corporate laws that
please the managers of publicly held firms, no state increases its
revenues by producing contract law that beats other states' contract
law.
The one interest group that may benefit from competition over
contract law is local attorneys. Just as Delaware attorneys derive
significant rents from Delaware corporate law, 26 one could posit that
commercial lawyers gain extra business were their state to become
the jurisdiction of choice for contract law. The obvious state with a
bar that may expend resources to attempt to become viewed as thejurisdiction of choice is New York. New York is generally regarded
as the commercial law capital of the country. Indeed, the New York
bar played a pivotal role in the original drafting and enactment of the
U.C.C.
12 7
There is some evidence that New York lawyers would be eager
to compete for business. New York law contains a provision that
authorizes its use for any contract whose value exceeds $250,000. 128
The statute does not require that the transaction out of which the
contract arose bear any relationship to New York. Of course, the
statute by itself has little affect. A party to the contract who
subsequently decides to avoid New York law could file suit in a state
that, absent the choice of law provision in the contract, would apply
its own law to the contract. Assuming that that state still follows the
traditional rule that for a choice of law clause to be effective it must
specify the law of a state that has a reasonable relationship to the
transaction, that state would then follow its own law rather than the
law of New York. This provision can thus be viewed more as a
signal that New York is willing to have its law used widely. In other
words, it is willing to compete for business, than be viewed as
competition itself.
126. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group
Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 469 (1987).
127. See Kamp, supra note 6.
128. See N.Y. General Obligation Laws § 5-1401 (2001).
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Yet even if the New York bar were willing to lobby to ensure that
New York contained value-enhancing rules for contracts, it remains
unclear how effective such lobbying would be in actually spurring
competition among the states. The problem is the potential agency
cost between a lawyer outside of New York and that lawyer's client.
That lawyer may be a specialist in the law of her own jurisdiction.
Specifying that the law of a different jurisdiction would apply to any
subsequent dispute would reduce the chance that the original lawyer
would handle that dispute. The lawsuit would more likely be handled
by a lawyer specializing in New York law. The desire to handle
future contractual disputes provides the lawyer with an incentive to
pick the law where she practices rather than the law of New York.
Thus, it is far from clear that elimination of Article 2 would
precipitate a competition among the states to produce better contract
law.
Another possible advantage of Article 2 is that it can reduce the
ability of any given state to extract rents from contractual parties.
States respond to pressure from those inside the state to expropriate
benefits from those outside of the state. Consider, for example, the
case of franchising. Franchisees tend to be located inside a state,
whereas franchisors are likely to reside outside of the state.
Legislatures can then pass laws that transfer benefits from the
franchisors to the franchisees. Indeed, to the extent that they allow
future parties to opt out of this law via a choice of law clause, they do
not run the risks of either encouraging franchisors to avoid their state
or passing along the cost of a new rule to future franchisees. 29 The
uniform law process can act as a constraint on this impulse. By
committing to regulate contracts for the sale of goods through the
U.C.C., a state can commit to forego attempts to pass legislation that
would tilt the contracting process in favor of instate interests.
The alternative to remitting the law of sales to the states is to
lodge. legislative responsibility with the federal government. After
all, the one recurrent criticism hurdled at the Article 2 revision
process is that it slights the interests of consumers. Consumer
groups, by and large, have had much more success at the federal level
than they have had in the U.C.C. drafting process. In terms of
legislation, their perceived ability to deliver votes gain the ear of the
legislator. In terms of administrative action, the Federal Trade
Commission for years enacted regulations targeted at protecting
consumer interests.
It is important, to note the limits of the argument that consumers
have been shut out of the U.C.C. drafting process. Not all contracts
129. See Erin Ann O'Hara, Opting Out ofRegulation: A Public Choice Analysis
of Contractual Choice of Law, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1551 (2000).
[Vol. 621140
ROBERT K RASMUSSEN
involve consumers. Many contracts are between sophisticated
entities. For them, they either like the default rules that Article 2
provides or they contract around them. For these entities, the primary
concern is that the provisions governing their contracts be default
rules. The ability to specify in the contract the term that the parties
want is more important than ensuring that the correct rule is on the
statute books. Moreover, this is a world where the cost of contracting
is declining. Information technology has made it cheaper to enter
into tailored contracts, and there is no reason to suggest that this trend
will reverse itself. The risk of transferring authority to the federal
government is the risk that the government will enact a mandatory
law of sales. While people may have differing intuitions on how
large this risk is, it is a risk nonetheless. For well-informed entities,
state regulation is preferable to federal law.
As to consumers, the FTC is better able to ferret out objectionable
practices than is the Article 2 process. Yet the FTC is not currently
set up to draft a commercial law code. Rather, it operates in a more
episodic fashion. It identifies problems with extant law, and then
passes regulations designed for those problems. In looking at these
problems, the FTC has advantages over the U.C.C. process.
Primarily, it has a staff of economists that can investigate competing
claims about the effects of current law. In short, the lack of
responsiveness in the U.C.C. process to consumer interest is at best
an argument for federal intervention limited to the consumer area. It
is not an argument for turning over primary responsibility for all of
sales law to the federal government.
3. Articles 3 and 4
If Article 2 is the "heart and soul" of the U.C.C., Articles 3 and
4 are its Achilles heel. They have, since their inception, been viewed
as the price that had to be paid in order to induce the banking lobby
not to block the entire U.C.C. project. In today's economy, the most
important commercial practice covered by these provisions is the
check system. This system has two distinct aspects. One is the check
collection process; the other is the relationship between the customer
and her bank.
Checks crisscross the country. No one seems to have
contemplated, let alone advocated, a nonuniform system for check
collection. The choice here is between federal law and the uniform
law process. Indeed, as recounted above, federal law has already
displaced large segments of Article 4. Federal law now regulates the
check collection process. Indeed, the ongoing effort to revise
Articles 3 and 4 was initiated in large part to bring these provisions
into line with Regulation CC. This goal has proven to be elusive.
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There was little interest on the part of the Federal Reserve Board and
the banking industry to redraft Articles 3 and 4 to comport with
Regulation CC. After it became evident that there was no industry
support for this harmonization effort, the NCCUSL approved a
"sharply truncated agenda for the project," consisting of
uncontroversial matters. 0 In short, Articles 3 and 4 seem to do little
work in this area.
State law in general and the U.C.C. in particular still regulate
many aspects of the consumer-bank relationship. For example,
Articles 3 and 4 specify which party bears the loss when a bank pays
on a forged check. Here, a customer may be held liable for the loss
to the extent that her negligence contributed to the loss. This
contrasts noticeably with the federal rules governing loss for
unauthorized use of a credit card or a debit card. In those situations,
the customer's liability is set at a specific amount; negligence is
simply not a relevant issue. Similarly, a customer using a credit card
has a much greater ability to undo the credit card payment than does
a customer using a check.'
One proposal is that this remaining area of state control be shifted
to the federal government. ' Ed Rubin has argued that even
conceding that the U.C.C. is better drafted than the federal laws on
payment systems, Congress should be assigned responsibility for
lawmaking here because it will do a better job than the current
uniform law process. The federal laws produce better outcomes for
two reasons. First, Congress draws on the expertise of the Federal
Reserve Board, which is generally thought of as one of the better
functioning administrative agencies. Second, the federal arena is
better suited for all interest groups to be heard than is the U.C.C.
drafting process.
Consider, for example, the issue of disclosure to consumers.
Articles 3 and 4 are silent on the issue of disclosure. Credit card
issuers, by contrast, are required to disclose certain facts to their
customers.' The tricky part in designing disclosure rules is ensuring
that the disclosure remains meaningful. At some point, adding
130. See April 3, 2002 memo. The revision addresses six issues, four of the
proposed changes are designed to bring Articles 3 and 4 into conformity with other
laws, a fifth change has the effect of protecting the FDIC when it is a receiver for
a bank that has lost an instrument that it was entitled to enforce (a district court had
held that even though the bank itself could have enforced the lost instrument, the
FDIC as receiver for the bank could not), and a final change that addresses the
liability between banks for losses resulting from a check generated from a telephone
conversation. See id.
131. See Mann, supra note 107.
132. See Rubin, supra note 5, at 579-86.
133. These obligations are set forth in the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation
Z promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board.
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additional information will decrease the amount of information that
the consumer actually reads. Too much disclosure can be as
uninformative as too little disclosure. Thus, the institution setting
disclosure standards needs to be able to balance the potential gain
from requiring a piece of information from being disclosed against
the cost that this disclosure imposes.'34 The process that produces the
U.C.C. provides no means by which this tradeoff can be answered.
The question of optimal disclosure is probably best left to an
administrative agency.
The final piece of Article 3 is the concept of negotiability of
notes. There is no need to repeat at length the argument that
negotiable instruments play no role in the modem economy. 3 1
Indeed, this was the case when Article 3 was first enacted.'36 In
short, there is little to be said for retaining Articles 3 and 4.
4. Article 9
Perhaps the area of law covered by the U.C.C. where the case for
uniformity is the most compelling is secured transactions. 137 The key
to all recordation systems is that third parties be able to ascertain
which filing system to consult when it wants to verify whether there
exists a senior claim on a debtor's assets. A filing system that no one
can find is of little value. With real estate, the answer of where to
look is relatively easy. The location of the land is fixed, and the
searcher merely has to learn at which level, state or local, the records
are kept. Things are not so simple, however, when the assets at issue
are movable, or even intangible, property. As an initial matter, one
can imagine at least three potential ways to determine which
jurisdiction in which one should look-the jurisdiction where the
assets are located (with, of course, rules determining where intangible
assets are to be found); the jurisdiction in which the debtor is
physically located; and, in the case of a corporate debtor, the
jurisdiction in which the debtor is incorporated.
The potential for problems with a nonuniform state-by-state
recordation system is readily apparent. Consider a debtor
incorporated in one state, the laws of which bases recordation on state
134. See Howard Beales, et al, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer
Information, 24 J.L. & Econ. 491, 524-26 (1981).
135. For an excellent examination of this issue, see Ronald J. Mann, Searching
for Negotiability in Payment and Credit Systems, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 951 (1997).
136. See Gilmore, supra note 9.
137. See Janger, supra note 17, at 626-30 (arguing that the uniform law process
is better than state-by-state regulation of secured transactions, but that federal
legislation would be better than uniform state regulation in terms of setting out the
priorities of creditors).
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of incorporation, but which has assets in another state, the laws of
which bases recordation on the location of assets. Indeed, it was a
concern with choice of law problems such as this that the drafters of
new Article 9 pointed to in their statement as to why all jurisdictions
should adopt their handiwork. 3 ' Whether these concerns motivated
states or not, the actual results are that all states quickly-adopted the
new article on secured transactions.
The real question is the extent to which one should choose
between the current U.C.C. process and one that lodges rulemaking
authority in the federal government. Both the benefits and the
shortcomings of the U.C.C. drafting process can be vividly
highlighted by the recent Article 9 revision. As to the benefits,
Article 9 is a very complex statute that took a good deal of expertise
to put together. While one can find fault with any statute, it is fair to
say that revised Article 9 is a better-drafted statute than almost any
statute produced at the federal level. One need only compare revised
Article 9 to the those portions of federal law covering the assignment
of rights in intellectual property to quickly ascertain the differences
in levels of technical expertise. 39
Were secured transactions included in the general jurisdiction of
Congress, it would be a tempting source of lobbying efforts. Secured
transactions involve a good deal of money. Recent experience with
bankruptcy reform legislation suggests that creditors, mainly credit
card companies, are willing to spend significant amounts of money
to press their views on Congress as to the appropriate social policy.
While one can admire the technical elegance of Article 9 and the
purity of motives of those who drafted it, one also must be cognizant
of the fact that consumer groups had little input in the process. As
described by both Bob Scott and Ted Janger, consumer groups had
more difficulty in pressing their interests than did secured lenders.
The most that they were able to secure, at least from their
perspective, was that things did not get worse. Also, the drafters of
the new Article 9 had little interest in considering the extent to which
secured credit imposes unjustifiable costs on tort victims and other
non-adjusting creditors. 40 All agree that banks played a dominant
role in the drafting of the revised Article 9.
The question then becomes whether assignment of legislative
authority should be switched to the federal level. On balance, it
should not. To see why this is so, recall that the federal government
can react against the backdrop of laws passed by the states. Indeed,
138. See memo, supra note 131.
139. See White & Summers, supra note 7, at 751 ("Most of these acts are
fragmentary and typically do not deal coherently with perfection of security
interests." Id.).
140. See Janger, supra note 17, at 611.
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in the area of secured transactions, the FTC banned cross-
collateralization clauses in consumer goods. Similarly, Congress in
the Fair Labor Standards Act made it impossible to sell "hot goods,"
goods produced in violation of the Act. 4' This provision has the
effect of ensuring that workers are paid the wages that they are
owed, even ahead of a secured creditor with a security interest in the
goods. So, the question is not whether the federal government
should act in the secured transactions area; rather, the question is
whether the federal government should act against a backdrop of
laws crafted by the U.C.C. lawmaking process or whether it should
act on its own.
Leaving the matter to be decided in the first instance by states via
the U.C.C. has a number of advantages. One is the line drawing
problem. If Congress were to have initial responsibility for some
subset of secured transactions and the states were to have
responsibility for others, we would need to articulate the basis on
which one decided that a transaction is governed by state law or by
federal law. This may not be an easy matter. For example, if one
were concerned that consumer interests are systematically slighted
in the U.C.C. drafting process, one may be tempted to suggest that
secured transactions involving consumers be regulated by federal
law. However, this requires a definition by which one could readily
identify which transactions are consumer ones and also raises the
concern that perhaps the category assigned to the federal
government is too narrow. After all, tort victims have few friends
in the Article 9 drafting process. Moreover, some unsecured
creditors may be ill-equipped to participate in that arena as well.
There is also the problem of the unanticipated case. While
Article 9 undoubtedly has not addressed every conceivable situation,
it has addressed many. New federal law is likely to have more
unaddressed problems. For example, federal law currently governs
security interests in intellectual property. All agree that those laws
answer far fewer questions than does Article 9. ' It is reasonable to
suppose that were. the federal government to assert primary
responsibility for crafting a law of secured transactions for a limited
set of cases, this law would be less complete than current Article 9.
While the observation that certain groups are underrepresented
in the Article 9 drafting process is correct, the better solution to this
problem is to have the federal government act on a targeted basis
against the background of this law rather than to cede primary
responsibility for secured transactions to Congress.
141. -See Citicorp v. Brock, 483 U.S. 27, 107 S.Ct. 2694 (1987).
142. See White & Summers, supra note 7.
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CONCLUSION
The last ten years taught us to be skeptical of the U.C.C. drafting
process. The laws produced no doubt reflect the input of interest
groups. Moreover, these interest groups do not necessarily reflect the
interests of society as a whole. In this regard, our conception of the
ALI-NCCUSL effort simply caught up with our conception of
lawmaking generally. There is no law crafting institution to which
we can assign responsibility for commercial law, nor can we
complacently assume that the output will advance the public good.
To be sure, the public legislative process operates differently from
the private one. Nevertheless, these advantages do not justify the
wholesale abandonment of the U.C.C. project. We could easily live
without Articles 3 and 4. But as to the rest of the extant Code, we are
better off with it than without it. When viewed against the ideal, the
U.C.C. comes up short; when viewed against its competitors, it still
comes out ahead.
